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F. Ismail

Following the conclusion of the Peace of Paris,[2] the Ottoman government had no desire for involvement in the main current of European affairs, yet it found it impossible to resist Russian pressure for the renewal of the Russo-Ottoman alliance. French victories over the Austrians and the Russians in late 1805, however, diminished Russian prestige and enabled the Ottoman government to adopt measures designed to reduce Rusian interference in the Ottoman Empire and to ensure Ottoman neutrality. The outcome was a gradual deterioration in Russo-Ottoman relations. A crisis was reached in August 1806, when, in contravention of the *Hatt-ı Şerif* of 1802,[3] the Ottoman government deposed the pro-Russian hospodars of Moldavia and Wallachia before their terms of office had expired and appointed pro-French hospodars in their stead. Russia demanded the reinstatement of the deposed hospodars and threatened a rupture in relations if the Ottomans did not comply. The latter had no desire for a war with Russia and submitted to the humiliation of reinstating the hospodars. This concession, however, did not satisfy the Russian government, and in November a Russian army invaded the Danubian Principalities.

Russia's motives for invading the Principalities have never been satisfactorily explained. When Kamensky, the Russian Commander-in-Chief on the Vistula, pointed out the disadvantages of creating a second front at a critical time, when Russia needed to concentrate her forces on the Vistula against Napoleon, Tsar Alexander gave two reasons for his action: his desire to aid the Serbians (who had been in rebellion against the Porte since 1803, but who, at that juncture, required no aid), and, more important, his uncertainty about Ottoman intentions. He argued that the second consideration would have immobilised an army on the Dniester in any case, so it was preferable to invade.[4] It can probably be safely asserted that at this stage the acquisition of territory did not form a part of Russian designs.

Russia, however, soon recognised that her invasion of the Principalities had been a great blunder, so that when British efforts (both diplomatic and military) to induce the Ottomans to re-establish their relations with Russia failed, she decided to approach the Ottomans directly and despatched Pozzo di Borgo to the Dardanelles. The Ottomans did not respond to Pozzo di Borgo's overtures, and no negotiations had taken place when Russia and France made the treaty of Tilsit. From the instruction given to Pozzo di Borgo it is clear that in the spring of 1807 Russia did not contemplate the retention of any Ottoman territory. It is also clear that, though desirous of setting up Serbia into a principality similar in status to the Danubian Principalities, Russia was not prepared to jeopardise her own vital interests for the sake of the Serbians.[5]

Under the stipulations of the treaty of Tilsit Russia accepted French mediation between herself and the Porte, and Russian and Ottoman plenipotentiaries were duly appointed to negotiate at Paris. At Tilsit Napoleon

and Alexander had discussed the partition of the Ottoman Empire, and now Alexander demanded that, as a prelude to a more general partition, Russia should be allowed to retain the Danubian Principalities. He also wished to retain the coastal area from Anapa to Poti on the eastern Black Sea littoral, and to set up Serbia into a principality. The Ottomans on their part, relying on repeated French promises of support, required not only the restoration of all the areas occupied by Russia, but the end of all Russian interference in the Ottoman Empire, and Russian agreement to the closure of the Straits of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles to all foreign warships. In the event no serious negotiations took place, but the hostilities which were suspended in July 1807 were not resumed until April 1809. By this time the Russians considered a war between Russia and France inevitable and wished to force the Ottomans quickly into ceding the Principalities and making peace. The Serbians co-operated with them.

On the Asiatic front the Russians made important gains. Poti fell to them in 1809, Sohum in 1810 and Ahilkelek in 1811. The rulers of Mingrelia, Abkhazia and Guria all sided with Russia. King Solomon of Imeretia alone sided with the Ottomans, but in 1810 he was defeated and taken prisoner. Despite the importance of the Ottoman losses, however, the war would be determined by events on the European front, and there Russia was unable to secure a decisive advantage. Owing to other demands on her resources, Russia was never able to concentrate sufficient forces on the Danube to overwhelm the Ottomans. Moreover, she experienced logistic difficulties and was obliged to confine herself to seasonal campaigning. Hence until the resulting stalemate was broken, there was no prospect of peace. Meanwhile, in the numerous communications which Russia made to the Porte either through intermediaries or directly, she insisted on the extension of the Russian frontier to the Danube. The Porte on its part consistently refused to make any territorial concessions whatsoever.

The military stalemate was broken in October 1811, when the Russians gained a decisive advantage. In September 1811 Laz Ahmed Paşa, the Grand Vezir and *Serdar-ı Ekrem* (Commander-in-Chief), made a surprise attack on the Danubian island of Slobozia, which lay between Rusçuk and Giurgiu, and having taken it crossed in force to the left bank of the Danube and entrenched himself. Then, despite fierce engagements, neither side made any progress and deadlock ensued. Ahmed Paşa, however, had made the fatal error of leaving his headquarters at Rusçuk without adequate defence. On the night of 13 October a Russian force under General Markov crossed the Danube and took the Ottoman headquarters by surprise. The Ottomans were seized by panic. Markov quickly overwhelmed whatever light resistance he encountered, occupied the Ottoman batteries on the shores of the Danube and turned them against the Ottoman forces on the left bank and on the island of Slobozia. This move cut off Ahmed Paşa and the main body of his army on the left bank of the Danube. On the night of 14 October Ahmed Paşa himself succeeded in re-crossing the Danube, but his army remained trapped.[6]

At Rusçuk Ahmed Paşa convened a council meeting and reviewed the position. The council concluded that the Porte had no alternative but to sue

for peace. Ahmed Paşa's main concern was to relieve his beleaguered army, but the forces at his disposal were not sufficient to effect that objective.[7] Consequently he demanded an armistice. Kutuzov, the Russian Commander-in-Chief, insisted that the bases of negotiations should be fixed before the suspension of hostilities. Owing to the imminence of war with France, Russia was anxious to make peace, and to achieve it she had abandoned the demand that the Danube should constitute the new frontier; according to Joseph Ledoulx,[8] on 24 October Kutuzov received positive orders to make peace on whatever terms he could and to march the second grenadier division to Poland, but Kutuzov was not prepared to throw away his advantage. He demanded that before the cessation of hostilities the Porte should formally agree to certain concessions. Ahmed Paşa offered to cede Hotin and its territory to Russia or to pay an indemnity. Kutuzov found these unacceptable and proposed the border between Moldavia and Wallachia as the new Russo-Ottoman frontier. Subsequently he reduced his demand and proposed the cession of Moldavia up to the river Sereth. He also demanded the retention of the areas Russia had occupied on the Asiatic front, and internal autonomy for Serbia.[9]

Confronted with Kutuzov's firmness, Ahmed Paşa progressively increased the area he was prepared to cede in Europe, but he absolutely refused to consider any cession whatsoever in Asia. In a letter conveyed by Mehmed Esad Efendi, he offered to cede a part of Bessarabia up to the rivers Konduk and Bik, and including Hotin, Bender and Akkerman. When Kutuzov declined this, he offered to cede the territory on the left bank of the Pruth. Kutuzov continued to insist on the Sereth, and Ahmed Paşa acquiesced in this, but he evaded Russia's other demands and announced his decision to send Mehmed Said Galib Efendi with plenipotentiary powers to negotiate a definitive settlement.[10]

Kutuzov welcomed this announcement, but warned that although an accommodation might be reached in Europe, his demand concerning the position in Asia could admit no modification whatsoever.[11] Ahmed Paşa preferred to leave the settlement of this question to the plenipotentiaries and did not reply to Kutuzov's letter, but it was evident that the position in Asia would become a major issue in the negotiations.

The Russo-Ottoman negotiations commenced at Giurgiu and were subsequently transferred to Bucharest. The Ottoman negotiators were Mehmed Said Galib Efendi, until recently Reis Efendi, but since July 1811 *Kethüda;* Müftüzade Ibrahim Selim Efendi, the Kazasker of Anatolia; and Abdülhamid Efendi, the secretary of the Janissaries. They were assisted by Demetrius Moruzzi, the Dragoman of the Porte. The Russian plenipotentiaries were André Italinsky, formerly ambassador at the Porte; Lieutenant-General Jean Sabaniev; and Joseph Fonton, one of Russia's experts on Ottoman affairs, and uncle of the interpreters Pierre and Antoine Fonton.

The Ottoman negotiators arrived at Giurgiu on 25 October and the first formal negotiating session was held in a tent on 31 October. In a letter to Ahmed Paşa the Ottoman negotiators explained how they conceived their objectives. They argued that whatever modifications they might induce the Russians to make in their original demands would be a gain. They declared

that the paramount needs of the moment were to free the beleaguered Ottoman army and to restore order at the Ottoman headquarters. As they had not yet received their powers and instructions from Istanbul, they considered it essential to gain time. Once the Ottoman army recovered its morale and was strengthened, they preferred to renew the hostilities rather than make peace on the terms proposed by Russia. They did not wish to become the instruments of a dishonourable peace.[12]

Although they had no powers, the Ottoman negotiators proposed that the negotiations should commence immediately. The Russian plenipotentiaries agreed and commenced by stating their requirements in Europe. They demanded that the whole of Bessarabia and Moldavia should be ceded to Russia and that the most southerly outlet of the Danube, the Mouth of St. George, should form the new frontier. This latter demand would give Russia control of all the outlets of the Danube. The Ottoman negotiators pointed out that in the preliminary correspondence between Ahmed Paşa and Kutuzov the Sereth had been mentioned as the frontier. This would leave part of Moldavia in Ottoman possession. The Russian plenipotentiaries decided to refer the question to Kutuzov, and this set the pattern for the rest of the negotiations: every time a point at issue could not be resolved, it was referred to Kutuzov or Ahmed Paşa, whoever was appropriate.[13]

At the second session (1 November) the Russian plenipotentiaries announced that Kutuzov accepted the Sereth as the future frontier. The discussion then turned to the question as to which Danubian outlet should form the frontier. The Ottoman negotiators argued that the Kilia Mouth, the most northerly outlet, was the natural outlet for Russia. The fact that this outlet was not as useful for navigation as the others was immaterial. Eventually the question was referred to Kutuzov and the compromise he suggested, the Sulina (or Sunne) Mouth, was adopted.[14]

Once the question of new frontiers in Europe was settled, the Russian plenipotentiaries proposed that the privileges of Wallachia and that portion of Moldavia which was to be restored should be redefined. The Ottoman negotiators opposed this, but they could not prevail. At the fourth session (4 November), the Russians proposed a twelve-clause article regulating the position in the Principalities. Some of these clauses referred to taxation and trade, for example, clause 6 gave the Porte the right of preemption, but stipulated that the producers should be free to dispose of their surplus produce as they saw fit; and clause 7 stipulated that the Porte should pay the market-price for what it bought; but others were more controversial. Clause 8 stipulated that the hospodars' term of office should be fixed at seven years and that they should neither resign nor be dismissed. Ex-hospodars should be able to reside in the Principalities, but they should not be eligible for re-election. Clause 9 stipulated that each hospodar should be able to send two agents (*Kapıkethüdası*) to the Porte, to look after their interests. Clause 12 required that the Porte should appoint as hospodars only those approved by Russia.[15]

The Ottoman negotiators strongly objected to these proposals. They argued that as the Porte was ceding some territory, it had a right to demand that Russia should renounce all the stipulations regarding Wallachia and

'Little Moldavia', but that in order to facilitate a settlement, they were prepared to renew their former engagements. They particularly objected to the stipulation which would diminish their freedom to appoint hospodars. After considerable debate, the two sides agreed that the Russian proposals should be adapted in conformity with former treaties and discussed further.

The question of the Asiatic frontier was also raised during the fourth session. The Russian plenipotentiaries insisted that there should be a settlement on the basis of *uti possidetis*. Such a settlement would give Russia the entire eastern Black Sea littoral, from Anapa in the north to Poti in the south. This was wholly unacceptable to the Porte. The Ottoman negotiators pointed out that Ahmed Paşa had categorically stated that on the Asiatic front the pre-war position must be restored. Eventually this question was also referred to Kutuzov, who declared that the Grand Vezir must reconsider the question, for he himself could not retract his demand. Ahmed Paşa instructed the Ottoman negotiators to evade the question until the arrival of their powers. If the Russians raised the subject, they were to state that it was outside their powers, and that it would be determined by the Grand Vezir and Kutuzov. In the event, when Kutuzov sent Pierre Fonton to discuss the question with the Grand Vezir, no agreement could be reached, but Ahmed Paşa declared that if Kutuzov desired the renewal of the war, he was ready. Fonton diplomatically suggested that the question should be referred back to the negotiators.[16]

At the end of 1800 Russia had annexed Georgia (Kartlo-Kakheti) and subsequently she had taken Mingrelia and Imeretia under her direct protection. She was still in the process of consolidating her hold on these and the adjoining provinces. The dominant geographical feature of the regions lying between the Caspian and the Black Sea was the Caucasian Mountains. In their southward expansion the Russians were obliged to overcome this natural barrier. In order to improve their communications with Georgia they had built the military road from Mozdok to Kazbek and this became a major route for the movement of troops, but water transport continued to be the most practicable mode of moving bulky supplies. Both in relation to the sources of supply and the final destination of the supplies, the Black Sea was of greater importance to Russia than the Caspian. Mingrelia, Imeretia and Georgia were most readily accessible via the Black Sea and the Phasis (Rioni) route, hence the Russian interest in the continued use of this route.

The entire eastern Black Sea coast was indubitably Ottoman territory. Russia's use of the eastern Black Sea ports and the Phasis route depended upon the Porte's pleasure. In 1804, while they were still allies, Russia had sought to induce the Porte to abandon the area between Poti and Anakra by arguing that this area was barren, uninhabited and of no use whatsoever to the Porte, whereas it was militarily vital to Russia.[17] On this occasion Russia did not dispute the possession of the eastern Black Sea littoral, because Alexander 'aimait mieux prendre à cet égard un arrangement amical avec la Sublime Porte'.[18]

The Ottomans produced detailed evidence to prove that the area in question was not barren and uninhabited as Russia had asserted, and the Reis Efendi of the period had told Italinsky, the Russian envoy, that 'among

Muslims, in the Ottoman territories, the abandonment of an area inhabited by Muslims and containing Muslim homes, castles, public buildings and mosques was forbidden. The question affected religion and was therefore beyond the competence of the Ottoman government'. Nevertheless, the Ottomans did not wish to offend Russia by refusing her access through their territories on the Black Sea coast. Yet they suspected that Russia's real object was to secure Ottoman recognition of her position in Georgia, and they believed that if they gave Russia written permission to use the Black Sea ports and the Phasis route, this would amount to a recognition of her position in Georgia. They were determined to avoid this, and they acquiesced in Russia's use of the area in question without compromising their stance over Georgia.[19]

The Russians, however, were not content to allow matters to rest. They wished to secure uninterrupted communications with Mingrelia, Imeretia and Georgia. Consequently, despite their amicable relations with the Porte, they occupied Anakra and established a depot and a garrison at Kemhal. The Ottomans protested vigorously, but Italinsky excused Russia's encroachments by referring to the ferocious character of the native inhabitants of the region.[20] This was how the matter stood when the Russo-Ottoman war had broken out in 1806.

The Ottoman determination not to cede any territory on the Asiatic front was re-iterated in a letter from Ahmed Paşa to Kutuzov, and in a discussion between Galib Efendi and Italinsky. Ahmed Paşa declared categorically that there could be no cession on both fronts. He could not consent to any cessions on the Asiatic side; this was a question which he himself would need to refer to the Sultan. Galib Efendi amplified this. He told Italinsky: 'Just as this question is beyond the competence of the Grand Vezir, if it were referred to the Sultan, it would be beyond even his competence, for there are certain subtleties, namely communal and religious obstacles which are difficult to define. In short it [any cession on the Asiatic side] is impossible'.[21]

Most of the conferences following the fourth session were devoted to the discussion of the Russian proposals regarding the Principalities. The Russian proposals that hospodars should not be able to resign, and that ex-hospodars should be permitted to reside in the Principalities occasioned considerable debate. The Ottoman negotiators argued persuasively that the retention of unwilling hospodars was hardly conducive to good government. They also argued that if ex-hospodars were permitted to reside in the Principalities, this would lead to the creation of factions and to unrest. The Russian argument that once they were ineligible for re-election the ex-hospodars would have no incentive to encourage factionalism appeared questionable. Moreover, the Ottomans could not accept the stipulation that hospodars should not be eligible for re-election. As no agreement could be reached, at the end of the sixth session the Ottoman negotiators referred the question of residence to the Grand Vezir. The latter declined to accept the Russian proposal, and at the end of the tenth session (18 November) the Russians announced that Kutuzov had agreed to renounce it.[22]

By the end of November most of the stipulations concerning the Principalities had been thoroughly debated and settled. In addition some un-

controversial questions, such as those concerning the exchange of prisoners and the resumption of trade, were settled without much difficulty.[23] A turning-point was reached when the Ottoman negotiators announced the receipt of their powers and instructions from Istanbul, and intimated that the Sultan required certain changes in the bases of the negotiations. Kutuzov's first impulse was to refuse the exchange of powers, but he soon overcame his anger and the twelfth session was held on 29 November. Italinsky argued menacingly that the acceptance of the original bases proposed by Russia had been a condition of the armistice. When he learned that the Sultan could not accept the Sereth frontier, he broke up the conference.[24]

When the news of the Ottoman set-back and Ahmed Paşa's decision to sue for peace reached Istanbul, the Sultan and the ministers admitted the necessity for negotiations, and the Şeyhülislâm issued a *fetva* authorising them.[25] The instructions to the Ottoman negotiators were determined at a council meeting convened by Şakir Ahmed Paşa, the Kaymakam, and sanctioned by the Sultan. Latour-Maubourg, the French chargé d'affaires informed the Ottoman government that a war between France and her allies on the one hand, and Russia on the other was imminent, and he urged it to resist an immediate settlement with Russia even if it involved some hardship.[26] This and other evidence of an impending rupture between Russia and France convinced the Ottoman councillors that Russia needed peace as much as they did, and this made them confident that if they adopted a firm stance in the negotiations they would secure terms approximating to their wishes. They drew up their instructions accordingly. The plenipotentiaries were to insist that in Europe the Pruth and not the Sereth should form the new frontier. This would give Russia Bessarabia, but it would leave the rest of Moldavia in Ottoman possession. In Asia the plenipotentiaries were not to agree to anything other than the restoration of the pre-war position. They were to refuse any discussion concerning the Serbians on the grounds that the latter were indisputably the Porte's rayah subjects; and they were to press for the renunciation of the privileges of the Principalities. They were also to demand that Persia should be 'comprised' in any settlement.[27]

The Ottomans did not expect to secure everything they demanded, and they would have been content, for example, to renew their former engagements regarding the Principalities, but they acted upon the principle that the higher they pitched their demands the more likely would they be to secure moderate terms. They complemented this approach by instructing the plenipotentiaries to argue that if Russia wanted a durable peace she should not seek to impose unpalatable terms upon the Porte.

Following the abrupt ending of the twelfth session, Galib Efendi sought to avert a total breakdown in the negotiations and he requested an interview with Italinsky. Kutuzov's first reaction to the Ottoman announcement that the Sereth frontier was unacceptable was to resume the hostilities, but when he learned about Galib Efendi's overture he responded positively and the interview between Galib Efendi and Italinsky took place on the same day.

Galib Efendi argued that Sultan Mahmud sought long-term rather than short-term advantages, and for that reason he would not follow the advice of Russia's opponents. He desired peace with Russia but he would not consent

to it unless his wishes were met. He intended that whatever settlement was reached it should not leave any unresolved problems and for that reason he asked for the restoration of the pre-war frontiers on both fronts. If Russia agreed to this, the Porte would agree to a secret article granting an indemnity to Russia. If necessary, it would even engage to form an alliance with Russia, subject only to the stipulation that it should be formed when the Porte's financial position permitted it. This last suggestion was not authorised by the Porte, but Galib Efendi believed that both the engagement to pay an indemnity and that to form an alliance could be easily evaded.[28]

Italinsky refused to be drawn by Galib Efendi's studiedly vague proposals, and Galib Efendi feared that unless he made some concrete concessions Italinsky would break off the discussions. He asked whether Russia insisted on some territorial gain, and, in response to Italinsky's affirmative reply, he offered Hotin and its territory. When Italinsky contemptuously dismissed this offer, Galib Efendi proposed as the Porte's final offer to cede the territory bounded by the Pruth, but excluding Bucak and the fortresses of Ismail and Kilia. In addition he warned that the Porte would not discuss the future of the Serbians with Russia, and he demanded Russia's renunciation of the stipulations concerning the Principalities.

Italinsky stated his own opinion that neither Kutuzov nor Alexander would accept the terms offered by Galib Efendi, and he announced that before further negotiations could take place, Kutuzov would have to refer to St. Petersburg.

The suspension of the negotiations did not affect the armistice. There had been a *de facto* armistice since 15 October, but a formal instrument was signed only on 8 December, after the suspension of the negotiations. Its main stipulations were that the armistice should be unlimited; that it should extend to Serbia; that if either side decided to renounce it, hostilities were to resume twenty days after the renunciation; and that the two sides should retain their positions, but the beleaguered Ottoman troops should not be treated as prisoners of war and they should be fed by Russia at the Porte's expense.[29]

Alexander's reply to the questions referred to him arrived at Bucharest, where the negotiations had been transferred, on 11 January 1812. On the 12 the plenipotentiaries of the two sides met in formal session. The Russian position remained unchanged. Alexander would not desist from his demands for the Sereth frontier and for the retention of the areas he had occupied on the Asiatic front. He also insisted on negotiating on behalf of the Serbians, for whom he wished to secure a tranquil existence under Russian guarantee. The Russian plenipotentiaries argued that the areas Russia wished to retain on the eastern Black Sea littoral were useless to the Porte and that they were a source of constant misunderstanding between the two powers. As regard to the Serbians, they argued that Alexander's dignity required that he should make some sort of provision in their favour.[30]

The Ottoman plenipotentiaries re-stated their position and declared categorically that they were unable to modify it. Out of deference to Russia they would promise the 'surety and tranquillity' of the Serbians, but they would admit no interference in the arrangement of their relations with the

Serbians. The usefulness of the eastern Black Sea littoral they reserved the right to determine for themselves. Thus, once again the negotiations reached deadlock.

The position was further exasperated by the Russian decision to renounce the armistice, and to treat the beleaguered Ottoman troops as prisoners of war. The Russian plenipotentiaries argued that in rejecting the bases of the negotiations the Sultan was guilty of a breach of faith, consequently the Tsar was justified in denouncing the armistice. The Ottoman plenipotentiaries pointed out that whereas the bases of the negotiations had not formed the subject of any written agreement, the armistice had been established by a written convention. To argue that the observation of the armistice depended upon the acceptance of the bases of negotiations was patently absurd, particularly when the rejection of the bases of negotiation had preceded the signature of the armistice convention.[31]

Neither the Ottoman plenipotentiaries nor Ahmed Paşa could explain the Russian refusal to modify the peace-terms. They conjectured that Russian inflexibility might be due to an unexpected improvement in Franco-Russian relations. Ahmed Paşa feared that Russia was seeking an excuse for the renewal of hostilities. He wrote informally to Kutuzov urging him to promote peace, while in his report to the Sultan he emphasised that the army was not in a position to renew the war.[32]

Galib Efendi suggested that the impasse might be overcome by inviting British interference. He had learned that a British plenipotentiary had been sent to St. Petersburg to make peace with Russia and to insist that the latter should also come to terms with the Porte. He assumed that the new British ambassador to the Porte would have instructions to facilitate the Russo-Ottoman negotiations. Even if the new ambassador had not yet arrived in Istanbul, Stratford Canning, the British minister plenipotentiary, might be requested to intervene. He believed that a letter from Canning might induce the Russians to modify their demands.[33]

The reports of the last conference at Bucharest and Kutuzov's ultimatum reached Istanbul on 6 February. Sultan Mahmud ordered that the Russian demands should be considered by a general council (*meclis-i umum*). Şakir Ahmed Paşa convened a council on 8 February and this met for three consecutive days. The debate concentrated mainly on enumerating the objections to the Russian terms. The demands that the Porte should agree to Russia's retention of the areas in her possession on the eastern Black Sea coast, and that it should engage to recognise Russia's future gains in that region were considered particularly objectionable. It was argued that by 'future acquisitions' Russia meant Abkhazia and Georgia. The Ottoman definition of Georgia was quite broad. It included not only Kartlo-Kakheti, but also Guria, Imeretia and Mingrelia. It was argued that once Russia was established on the eastern Black Sea coast and was able to consolidate her position in the interior, she would be able to strike at the very heart of the Ottoman Empire. Moreover, with the acquisition of the Black Sea littoral and its hinterland, Russia would acquire new recruiting grounds and her military power would correspondingly increase. There were also religious objections to the cession of the Black Sea littoral. The *Şeriat,* or religious

law, forbade the surrender of the faithful to the infidel, hence the Porte could not consent to the cession of a predominantly Muslim region to Russia.[34]

There was a consensus of opinion in the council that the Russian terms were too onerous and unacceptable, but everyone was impressed with the gravity of the Porte's military and financial distress, and no one was prepared to recommend the renewal of war. Eventually Mahmud found it necessary to prompt the council into making an unequivocal recommendation. In a *hatt-ı hümayun* he addressed to the council he declared that if the council was prepared to accept Russia's humiliating demands, then it should take the steps necessary for the conclusion of peace. However, he warned that if the council opted for peace on Russia's terms, in future, under different circumstances, no one should seek to disown his responsibility for accepting such humiliating terms. Moreover, he added that he could not consent to his troops being made prisoners of war. If the council decided to reject Russia's terms, then instead of engaging in useless debate, it should consider what measures were necessary for the renewal of the war.[35]

To all appearances this was a declaration in favour of war: the council took it as such and quickly resolved to renew the war and proceeded to consider various expedients for raising troops and money; Şanizade and Cevdet Paşa also placed a similar construction on it. What neither Şanizade nor Cevdet explained, however, was how it was, if this really was a declaration in favour of war, that the Ottoman government proceeded to renew the negotiations. All the evidence suggests that Mahmud's intervention was a shrewd move on his part. Although they were all convinced of the necessity of peace, the ministers were not prepared to face the consequences of recommending the acceptance of the Russian demands. The decisive factor seems to have been fear of adverse public reaction. This is where the attitude of the Janissaries was crucial, for public opinion mattered most in Istanbul and there it was largely shaped by the Janissaries. If on a fundamental issue the Janissaries were opposed to the course pursued by the government, they could easily rouse the public and a revolutionary situation could develop. Mahmud was not prepared to assume the sole responsibility for advocating peace. His object was apparently to demonstrate to everyone the impossibility of continuing the war and then to secure their unanimous decision in favour of peace. This is evident from the sequel.

Mahmud accepted the council's decision in favour of war and on 14 February ordered the Kaymakam to inform the Grand Vezir that war would be renewed.[36] Yet, shortly afterwards he informed the leading ministers that he shared the Grand Vezir's opinion regarding the impossibility of continuing the war with Russia, expressed his view that the decision to make peace or war should be entirely referred to the Grand Vezir and ordered them to reverse the decision taken by the general council. In the meetings of the *encümen-i şura* that followed, the ministers took care to secure explicit statements from everyone present that it really was impossible for them to continue the war. They asked the military leaders what progress had been made in raising more troops and obliged them to admit that it was impossible to raise adequate forces. The outcome was an unanimous agreement to

reverse the earlier decision in favour of war and to refer the question of peace or war entirely to the Grand Vezir.[37]

The Sultan's decision to make peace did not mean that he was prepared to yield to the Russian demands concerning the Asiatic frontier. He was in the last resort prepared to agree to the Sereth frontier in Europe, and as the price for this concession he seems to have believed that he could induce the Russians to abandon their demands relating to the Asiatic frontier, for he was convinced that Russia needed peace as much as the Porte. Accordingly he instructed the Grand Vezir to continue the negotiations. Ahmed Paşa himself was convinced that if the Russians could be induced to restore the pre-war position in Asia, an accommodation could be reached. His confidence was reflected in his instructions to the plenipotentiaries. He believed that the question of Serbian security might be settled in an acceptable manner; while that of the European frontier might be settled on the basis of the Pruth with various permutations, or, ultimately, on the basis of the Sereth. If, however, the war between France and Russia had broken out, the plenipotentiaries were to delay a settlement so that they might compel Russia to concede peace on the Porte's terms.[38]

The Porte also acted upon Galib Efendi's advice and obtained letters from Stratford Canning to Italinsky and to the Duc de Sierra Capriola, the ex-Neapolitan minister and Canning's correspondent in St. Petersburg. Canning had no instructions to correspond directly with the Russians, but he was anxious to establish confidential relations with the Ottoman government and the opportunity to ingratiate himself appeared too good to be missed. He complied with the Ottoman request, but as the price of his compliance he exacted a promise from the acting Reis Efendi that the Porte would confide in him unreservedly and keep him informed of the progress of the negotiations.[39]

In the letter he sent to the Duc de Sierra Capirola under flying seal, through Italinsky, Canning recommended moderation to Russia, lest the Porte should throw itself into the arms of France. He explained that the Ottomans saw any concessions in Asia as a threat to their independence and security; that they regarded the privileges Russia enjoyed in the Principalities as a principal cause of the war and wished to avoid their renewal; and that they wished Persia to participate in the peace.[40]

Meanwhile Latour-Maubourg endeavoured to prevent a Russo-Ottoman settlement. His instructions from Napoleon clearly reflected the state of Franco-Russian relations. As late as August 1810 Napoleon declared that he was not opposed to the cession of the Principalities to Russia, but that he would not permit Russia to establish herself on the right bank of the Danube. It was a measure of his total failure to appreciate the mood of the Ottomans that he intended this as a warning to the Porte not to agree to any cessions on the right bank.[41] As his relations with Russia became increasingly strained, Napoleon steadily drifted towards an alignment with the Porte. In February 1811 he instructed Latour-Maubourg to establish cordial relations with the Porte and to prepare the ground for a rapprochement. As Muhib Efendi was being recalled from Paris, he was to persuade the Porte to send another ambassador and to intimate, as an inducement, that France would

also appoint an ambassador. Had Napoleon known that the Ottomans considered the absence of a French ambassador a blessing, he would not have offered such a dubious inducement. Latour-Maubourg was to continue to act circumspectly, and he was not to permit the Russian party to perceive any apparent change in his conduct. In April 1811 Napoleon was less reserved, but he was still not prepared to sanction any overt action against Russia. He instructed Latour-Maubourg to prepare the ground for the conclusion of an offensive and defensive alliance with the Porte. He offered to guarantee to the Porte the possession of the Principalities, and to aid in the recovery of the Crimea, but he still did not authorise Latour-Maubourg to conclude anything. Everything was to be settled when an Ottoman ambassador reached Paris. He directed him: 'être prudent, car tout peut s'arranger en Russie mais au moment où l'ambassadeur turc sera arrivé à Paris, tout sera décidé et on agira selon les circonstances'.[42]

Napoleon evidently believed that he might still be able to patch up his differences with Russia, and he wished to be in a position to abandon the Ottomans with facility. This half-hearted approach, however, was unlikely to win him an ally. In the event Latour-Maubourg found it necessary to go beyond his instructions and oppose Russia openly. In November and December he urged the Ottomans to resist Russia's demands, and he persuaded them to promise to send a new ambassador to Paris. Muhib Efendi had finally departed from Paris on 26th August 1811, leaving his secretary, Galib Efendi, in charge of the embassy, but three days later the latter had died from phthisis and only the interpreter, Angelo, remained to represent the Porte at Paris.

At the beginning of 1812 Napoleon irrevocably resolved to attack Russia. On 21 January he instructed Latour-Maubourg to prevent a Russo-Ottoman settlement and to induce the Ottomans to send an ambassador to Paris. On the 27 he proposed an offensive and defensive alliance and outlined its terms. He wanted the Ottomans to co-operate in the forthcoming war against Russia, and proposed that the Sultan should personally lead an army of 80,000 across the Danube and meet him in Poland. In return he was prepared to guarantee the Porte's existing possessions, and, if successful against Russia, to aid in the recovery of the Crimea. In addition, he engaged to re-establish the Kingdom of Poland, whose destruction, he argued, had been so much to the Porte's detriment.[43] Rather belatedly, he also wrote a letter to Sultan Mahmud acknowledging one sent to him as early as 1808.

These instructions did not reach Istanbul until 4 March. Meanwhile, on 15 February, Napoleon sent Latour-Maubourg full powers to conclude an alliance, but he still instructed him to act cautiously and not to reveal his powers or commit anything to paper before the Porte had appointed plenipotentiaries. Although it was he who sought an alliance, he wished to make the Porte appear as the suppliant.[44]

Napoleon's equivocal approach was partly due to the fact that he was waiting for the termination of the Franco-Austrian negotiations for an alliance. The alliance was concluded at Vienna on 14 March. One of its provisions was a guarantee of Ottoman integrity: as much a concession to Austria, who opposed Russia's acquisition of the Principalities, as an appeal

to the Porte. The news of the alliance reached Paris on 19 March, and Napoleon immediately sent Latour-Maubourg the project of a treaty to be concluded with the Porte.[45]

Some distinguished historians, including P. Coquelle and J. W. Zinkeisen have argued that had Napoleon authorised Latour-Maubourg to conclude an alliance with the Porte sooner, he might have succeeded. They maintain that in mid-February Sultan Mahmud was disposed to form an alliance with France. In support of this argument Coquelle cites a report from Latour-Maubourg which represents Mahmud as having declared:

> Ce que j'apprends des prétentions des Russes est un motif déterminant pour que je continue la guerre, de concert avec mon puissant ami l'Empereur des Français. Dès ce moment, mon parti est pris définitivement, je ne signerai pas la paix.[46]

It is impossible to determine whether Latour-Maubourg was merely seeking to flatter Napoleon, or whether he was being fed with false information. Sultan Mahmud may or may not have made such a statement. What is beyond dispute is that neither he nor any member of the Ottoman government were disposed to advocate an alliance with France, no matter what their predicament might be.

At the very moment when the Ottomans are represented as being disposed to form an alliance with France, Ahmed Paşa, the Grand Vezir, expressed his views on the subject of an alliance in the most explicit terms. Under French pressure, the ministers in Istanbul had nominated Necib Efendi as their ambassador to Paris, but they hesitated to despatch him because they anticipated that France would propose an alliance. They considered an alliance contrary to their interests and referred the whole issue to Ahmed Paşa. In his reply, dated 8 February, the Grand Vezir argued that after Tilsit Napoleon had not hesitated to sacrifice Ottoman interests, and expressed his opinion that not only would the Porte derive no advantage from an alliance with France, but it would incur Britain's displeasure. He recommended that when the French proposed an alliance the Porte should decline it and express its intention to remain neutral.[47]

The ministers in Istanbul fully shared the Grand Vezir's distrust of France. On 29 March Latour-Maubourg had an interview with Şakir Ahmed Paşa at which he proposed an alliance. Ahmed Paşa showed no enthusiasm for an alliance. He observed that Napoleon had been profuse in his promises in the past but had not kept them.[48]

Meanwhile, despite the fact that the Russians had denounced the armistice and re-occupied Sistova (February 1812), the Russo-Ottoman negotiations continued. Galib Efendi declared that the question of the Asiatic frontier alone stood in the way of a settlement, and he announced that unless this question was settled first, he would not proceed to the discussion of others.[49]

As the Franco-Russian war was drawing closer, Kutuzov was anxious to avoid a rupture in the negotiations. In mid-March he invited the Ottoman plenipotentiaries to a conference and communicated Russia's latest terms. He proposed that the Sereth should remain the basis in Europe and that the

question of the Asiatic frontier should be either deferred or left unsettled. The Russian government maintained that the disputed areas in Asia were ruled by Christian princes who had voluntarily submitted to Russia, consequently Russia could not abandon them. It proposed that either the disputed areas should be left under Russian control for five years and a settlement negotiated at the end of that period; or that the question should be left wholly unmentioned. Serbia was to have internal autonomy, and the *cizye* and other Serbian taxes were to be fixed by the Porte but collected by the Serbians. The privileges of the Principalities were to be maintained as they had been defined at Giurgiu. When Galib Efendi declared that he could not make any concessions on the question of the Asiatic frontier, Kutuzov announced his decision to refer once more to his government.[50]

At this stage Sweden intervened with an offer of her good offices. A Swedish agent named Horn[51] arrived at Bucharest with the twin objects of facilitating the Russo-Ottoman negotiations and inducing the Ottomans to form an alliance with Russia and Sweden. He was accompanied by Lieutenant-Colonel Rochechouart, a Frenchman in Russian service, who was authorised to make certain new proposals to the Porte. After stating the objects of his mission to Galib Efendi at Bucharest, Horn, accompanied by Rochechouart, proceeded to the Ottoman headquarters and thence to Istanbul. As neither he nor his companion were invested with any official character, the Ottoman government refused to have any direct dealings with them. Rochechouart was actually turned back, while Horn was directed to state his business through Palin, the Swedish chargé d'affaires. Accordingly, on 6 April, Palin had a long conference with Hacı Halil Efendi, the Kazasker of Anatolia, and Mazhar Efendi, the acting Reis Efendi.

Forewarned that the purpose of the Swedish initiative was to propose an alliance, Sultan Mahmud had indicated how such a proposal was to be received. He wrote: 'none of the infidels, apart from the Englishman [Canning] are reliable. Each is seeking to further his own interests. This being the case, we must not be deceived by them'.[52]

Palin commenced by offering Sweden's good offices and announced that Russia had already accepted it. He intimated that Russia no longer insisted on the maintenance of the *status quo ad presentum* on the Asiatic frontier, and that she was prepared to give up her Asiatic conquests on condition that the Porte assigned for her use a port on the Mingrelian coast, so that she might communicate with Georgia with facility. He contended that the Porte was dangerously exposed, and that it was imperative, in the interests of its security, that it should make peace without delay. He ended up by proposing an alliance between Russia, Sweden and the Porte. The Ottoman ministers declared that they were not prepared to negotiate unless Russia entirely abandoned her claims on the Asiatic front and they dismissed the proposal for an alliance by arguing that there could be no talk of an alliance before there was peace. Nevertheless, they promised to refer his proposals to the Grand Vezir.[53]

As the Franco-Russian confrontation drew closer, the momentum of diplomatic activity in Istanbul accelerated. On the one hand the French, supported by the Austrians, urged the Porte to resist Russia's demands and

to form an alliance with France; on the other the Russians, the British and the Swedes instigated the Porte against France and Austria and pressed it to ally itself with Russia and Sweden. On 31 March Stürmer, the Austrian Internuncio, informed the Porte that Austria and France were concluding an alliance stipulating the integrity of the Ottoman Empire. Subsequently he officially notified the Porte of the formation of this alliance, but he admitted that he was not authorised to seek the Porte's accession to it. Meanwhile Canning urged the Ottomans to make peace without delay, and he secretly warned the Russians about the French proposals for an alliance with the Porte. He also attempted to discredit the Austrians by disclosing a secret Austrian plan, dating from March 1810, to invade the Ottoman Empire. Russia also endeavoured to discredit her opponents. On 24 March Kutuzov informed Galib Efendi that the French had proposed to settle their differences with Russia at the expense of the Ottoman Empire, but that Russia had declined this, for she considered the establishment of good relations between Russia and the Porte essential to the repose of Europe. He followed up this disclosure with a tentative proposal for an alliance. Galib Efendi was too astute a statesman to be influenced by calculated revelations. He characterised the Russian approach as a carefully-timed ruse, and he stated his opinion that an alliance with Russia was absolutely inadmissible. He firmly believed that neutrality was the best policy. Commenting upon his report, Sultan Mahmud wrote: 'It does not befit us to ally ourselves with anyone'.[54]

In one of his despatches Latour-Maubourg expressed the opinion that the certainty of an early Franco-Russian war alone could prevent the Ottomans from making peace. This was partly true, for the imminence of the Franco-Russian rupture encouraged the Ottomans to resist Russia's onerous demands; but paradoxically it also made them anxious to conclude peace before the hostilities could commence. Ahmed Paşa considered it important to reach a settlement before the French and Austrians could intervene.[55] The Ottoman plenipotentiaries concurred in this view. They believed that peace would deprive Napoleon of every pretext for encroaching upon Ottoman territories. They feared that the continued presence of the Russians in the Principalities would afford the French a convenient pretext for encroachment, but above all they were apprehensive that in view of his commitment to re-establish the Kingdom of Poland, if successful, Napoleon might seek to indemnify Austria for the loss of Galicia at the Porte's expense and he might even seek to annex some Ottoman territory to Poland.[56]

Ahmed Paşa believed that if the Russians would restore the pre-war position in Asia and be content, as Horn had intimated, with the use of a Mingrelian port an accommodation could be reached. Accordingly he instructed the plenipotentiaries to resume the negotiations. Kutuzov agreed to informal discussions, but, as neither side would modify its position on the issue of the Asiatic frontier, no progress could be made. It transpired that Kutuzov had no instructions on the subject of Horn's communication. On the contrary, Joseph Fonton argued that the possession of Kemhal and Anakra had been in contention even before the war, and that it was essential for Russia to have easy access to Georgia. From this Galib Efendi deduced that Russia's object was to annul those provisions of the treaty of Küçük

Kaynarca which related to Georgia and to secure formal recognition of her position there. Galib Efendi speculated that Russia might wish to evade a settlement until such time as the outcome of her impending contest with France became clear. He feared that, depending on the outcome of that contest, Russia might either increase her demands upon the Porte, or dispose of the Principalities according to Napoleon's wishes. He was equally suspicious of the French. He believed that Napoleon might attack the Ottoman Empire whatever the outcome of the Russo-French war. He believed that neutrality was indubitably the best policy the Porte could pursue, but argued that if an alliance with either France or Russia was unavoidable, one with France was preferable to one with Russia, for Russia was the Porte's inveterate enemy. He anticipated that in the event of a Franco-Ottoman alliance, France would insist on the dismissal of the British minister in Istanbul and on the Porte's adherence to the Continental System. In his view the Porte could not comply with either of these demands. Accordingly he suggested that the Porte should initiate steps in order to obviate the necessity of having to choose between Britain and France. Ahmed Paşa shared these views in every respect.[57]

Progress in the Russo-Ottoman negotiations was made only at the beginning of May, when the Russians considerably modified their position. At first they demanded the cession of the area behind the Mingrelian coast, but when the Ottomans proved unyielding, they reduced their demands and required simply the use of the area between Kemhal and Anakra.[58] In Europe they abandoned their demand for the Sereth frontier but insisted upon the cession of the whole area bounded by the Pruth and the Danube. They demanded that the Kilia Mouth should be assigned to Russia and that the Sulina Mouth should be made common.[59]

On 1 May the Grand Vezir instructed the Ottoman plenipotentiaries to consent to Russia's use of the port of Kemhal, but on the specific conditions that in Asia the pre-war frontier was restored and that in Europe the fortresses of Ismail and Kilia were left in Ottoman possession. On the questions of Serbia and the privileges of the Principalities he was adamant. The Serbians must surrender their arms and renew their allegiance to the Porte. As regards the Principalities, the plenipotentiaries were to insist that under no circumstance should Russia interfere in the appointment of the hospodars or in their terms of office.[60]

Ahmed Paşa's terms were sufficiently contentious to occasion prolonged negotiations, but on 9 May he received instructions from Istanbul to speed up the negotiations and to reach a settlement as quickly as possible. Curiously, just when the Russians adopted a flexible attitude towards the negotiations because the long-anticipated rupture in Russo-French relations seemed imminent, the Ottoman ministers in Istanbul received information that France and Russia were about to patch up their differences. This made them anxious to make peace before Russia was in a position to direct the greater part of her forces against them.[61]

Ahmed Paşa suspected that the rumours that France and Russia were moving towards an agreement were circulated by Russia and her partizans, for the fact that Russia was prepared to abandon her demand for the Sereth

indicated that Franco-Russian relations were approaching their crisis. Nevertheless he obeyed his instructions and modified his own instructions to Galib Efendi, for he believed that the Porte did not have the means to continue the war with Russia. Accordingly he consented to Russia's use of Kemhal without linking it to the demand for the retention of Ismail and Kilia. He still required the retention of these places, but in the last resort he was prepared to abandon them. However, he required it ceded, that their fortifications should be demolished and that thereafter no new fortifications should be built. He still offered Russia the Kilia Mouth of the Danube, but in the final resort he was prepared to make the Sulina Mouth common. His requirements concerning Serbia remained unchanged, but he proposed that the privileges of the Principalities should be settled by negotiation. On the question of an alliance, Galib Efendi was to be evasive. If pressed, he was to engage secretly to form an alliance, but he was to defer detailed discussions until the arrival of a Russian ambassador in Istanbul, and to stipulate that it should be formed only if it was consistent with the interests of the two sides.[62]

Kutozov accepted the Pruth and the use of the area between Kemhal and Anakra, but he made peace dependent upon the Porte's acquiescence in an alliance. The Ottoman plenipotentiaries had earlier declared that they were not authorised to discuss an alliance and they had already referred the question to Ahmed Paşa. Kutuzov, however, did not persist in his demand for an alliance. He suddenly speeded up the negotiations, and on 17 May the preliminaries were duly signed. These consisted of six articles. By article I the Pruth from the point it entered Moldavia to its confluence with the Danube and thence the Danube, via the Kilia branch, to the Black Sea were to form the new frontier. The Kilia branch of the Danube was to be common to both powers. Article II stipulated that by a secret article Russia should demolish the fortresses of Ismail and Kilia. Article III stipulated the restoration of the pre-war frontier in Asia, and declared that under a secret article the area between Anakra and Kemhal should be reserved for Russia's use. Article IV regulated the position in Serbia. It restored the Serbians to their former status as tribute-paying subjects of the Porte, and stipulated their disarmament. It provided for the demolition of the new and surrender of the old fortifications to the Ottomans, thus restoring complete Ottoman military control in Serbia. The Porte promised in turn to accord the Serbians a general amnesty; the same privileges as the islands of the Archipelago (Aegean); internal autonomy; and to regulate all these objects 'de concert avec la nation Servienne'. The Serbian *cizye* and other taxes were to be fixed and collected by the Serbians themelves. By article V the pre-war privileges of the Principalities were to be confirmed. Russia was to abandon the conditions discussed at Giurgiu. Article VI provided for the discussion of further articles and the arrangement of a definitive settlement.[63]

According to Admiral Paul Chichagov, there was a simple explanation for Kutuzov's conduct. On learning about the conclusion of the Franco-Austrian Alliance, Chichagov suggested that Russia should mount a diversionary attack on Austria and on French Illyria and Dalmatia. Alexander found this suggestion attractive, but he considered Kutuzov incapable of executing such a project. As he was already dissatisfied with Kutuzov's leisurely

conduct of the peace negotiations, he decided to recall him, and, accordingly he appointed Chichagov to the command of the Danubian army. He outlined his instructions to Chichagov verbally and permitted the latter to draw up his own instructions. Rumyantsev, the Russian Chancellor, was thus by-passed, apparently resented this arrangement and sent a courier to inform Kutuzov about Chichagov's impending arrival. Acting upon this advice, Kutuzov speeded up the negotiations.[64]

The execution of the projected Russian diversionary attack depended very largely upon Russia's relations with the Porte. For this reason Alexander gave priority to the termination of the negotiations and to the formation of a defensive and offensive alliance with the Porte. If necessary, he was prepared to secure the Porte's submission to his proposals by force. In any case, he proposed to employ the Black Sea fleet to menace the Porte and if necessary to act against it. He also considered it important to secure the co-operation and aid of the British forces in the Adriatic. Finally, he considered it important to organise or maintain the administration in the Principalities.

Chichagov arrived at Bucharest on 18 May, the day after the signature of the preliminaries. As the negotiations had advanced so far, he decided to permit Kutuzov, as a consolation for his recall, to conclude the peace and receive the attendant credit. However, he immediately pressed the Ottomans for an alliance. In order to avoid delay in the formation of an alliance, he proposed to send Italinsky to Istanbul. He suggested that in return for an alliance the Porte might be given back Dubrovnik and the Ionian Islands.[65]

Meanwhile the negotiations progressed rapidly and on 28 May two definitive instruments were signed, one patent and one secret.[66] The patent instrument comprised sixteen and the secret two articles. Article I of the preliminaries concerning the European frontier became article IV of the definitive patent instrument; article III, concerning the Asiatic frontier, became article VI; and article IV, concerning Serbia, became article VIII. The provision regarding the demolition of the fortresses of Ismail and Kilia became article I of the separate and secret instrument; while the second secret article embodied the important reservation which accorded to Russia the use of the area 'située à deux heures de la rive droite du Phâse et à quatre heures d'Anakra . . . comme une échelle pour assurer et faciliter le transport des munitions de guerre et autres objets nécessaires . . .'. In view of the Ottoman insistence that there should be an article concerning Persia, under article XIII Russia agreed to accept the Porte's good offices in terminating her war with Persia.

There was one important omission in the treaty which was directly attributable to the circumstances under which it was concluded. It made no mention of the passage of Russian warships through the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles. Formerly the Russian government had adopted an article drawn up by Prince Prosorovsky, formerly commander of the Russian Danubian army, which would have given Russia the right to use the Straits for the passage of warships at all times, with the sole limitation that not more than three warships were to pass through the Straits at any one time. At Bucharest the Russian government abandoned this demand because it realised that it would form an insurmountable obstacle to peace. However, Russian historians have argued, S. Goriainow by implication and B. Muraviev

explicitly, that, as article III of the treaty renewed the former engagements between Russia and the Porte, Russia still retained the right, under the treaty of alliance of 1805, to use the Straits for the passage of her warships.[67] Referring to article III of the treaty of Bucharest, Muraviev wrote: 'Au sens précis de cet article, sans le dire explicitement, les stipulations de l'article 7 (secret) du traité de 1805 se trouvent quand même pleinement confirmées'. This argument ignores the fact that the stipulations of the seventh secret article of the treaty of alliance of 1805 were intended to apply only so long as Russia and the Porte were committed to the defence of the Ionian Islands. Not only had the alliance lapsed with the outbreak of the Russo-Ottoman war, but in 1807 Russia had ceded the Ionian Islands to France. Moreover, the interpretation Goriainow placed on article 7, which Muraviev adopted, was based on a deliberate falsification of the text of the article. It is clear from the Turkish text of the article that it did not accord freedom of transit to Russian warships through the Straits 'in every instance'.[68]

Sultan Mahmud's refusal to sanction the arrangements made by the Grand Vezir and the plenipotentiaries once again threatened to wreck everything. Mahmud totally disapproved of any mention of an alliance and ordered Ahmed Paşa to discontinue all discussions on the subject. He also objected to the arrangement which accorded to Russia the use of the area between Anakra and Kemhal, and he ordered Ahmed Paşa to denounce it. Şakir Ahmed Paşa who communicated the Sultan's orders wrote: 'It has become manifest that the Moscovites' interest in the Anatolian question lies in the conveyance of munitions. Their aim hereafter is to conquer Georgia, Iran, Abkhazia and Circassia totally, and to execute the designs they have long harboured against the Ottoman Empire'. Rather than agree to an alliance, Mahmud and his ministers in Istanbul preferred 'to trust in providence', in other words, to renew the war.[69]

Ahmed Paşa received these instructions only on 28 May, the day on which the definitive instruments were signed. Instead of attempting to implement them, he defended his conduct. He declared that he was aware of the disadvantages of an alliance, but he pointed out that his last instructions were to conclude peace as soon as possible. Moreover, Russia had made the formation of an alliance and the use of Kemhal and the Phasis route the sole conditions for abandoning her demand for the Sereth and for restoring her Asiatic conquests. In his opinion the promise of a future alliance, to be formed at the Porte's convenience, and the grant of access on the eastern Black Sea coast did not constitute too high a price for peace. He was ready to renounce the preliminaries and to resume the war, but in that case he demanded that he should be given the means of fighting effectively. He argued that as the Porte manifestly lacked the means of waging war effectually, it was in its interest to make peace.[70] Galib Efendi concurred in this view.

Mahmud remained unconvinced. He maintained that Russia's insistence on the use of Kemhal showed that she harboured hostile designs against the Ottoman Empire, and pointed out that his object in seeking to include an article on Persia was to promote peace. He could not consent to an arrangement which afforded Russia facilities for attacking Persia. Accordingly he censured the Grand Vezir, ordered that all reference to an alliance should be

removed and that the concession regarding Russia's use of Kemhal should be withdrawn. In order to make the Grand Vezir's task easier, he proposed that Stratford Canning should be induced to write 'secretly' to the Russians to press them to abandon this concession and to intimate that unless they agreed, the Porte would reject the entire settlement.[71]

Before Mahmud's orders could be implemented, on 2 June, the Porte received the definitive instruments and a council was convened to consider them. Objections were raised not only to the second secret article which reserved the area between Anakra and Kemhal for Russia's use, but also to the VIIIth article concerning Serbia. It was argued that if the Porte accepted these conditions Russia would soon extend them and she would soon appoint a hospodar to Serbia. The Serbians might be eventually wholly enfranchised. The ministers were prepared to grant an amnesty to the Serbians, but they required the abrogation of the provisions which gave the Serbians internal autonomy and the same privileges as the islands of the Archipelago, and which stipulated for the payment of the Serbian taxes at a fixed rate and for their collection by the Serbians themselves. They considered these incompatible with the Porte's sovereignty. At another council meeting the ministers argued that if the Serbians were accorded internal autonomy, the entire rayah population of Rumelia would migrate into Serbia. As the Serbians were a warlike nation, such a development would have serious repercussions affecting the security of Rumelia and Bosnia. Hence it was imperative to modify article VIII. The council also required that the second secret article should be dropped. Russia's use of the area in question could be discussed after the peace. Accordingly the ministers proposed that the ratifications should be drawn up in five or six different versions, and the appropriate version should be exchanged, depending on whether Russia accepted or declined the modifications they proposed.[72]

Mahmud shared the council's uneasiness regarding the implications of article VIII. In his view Russia had ulterior motives for stipulating the Serbian privileges, and he was convinced that if the Porte accepted these as they stood it would soon be involved in a war with Russia. However, as the treaty had been signed, Mahmud realised that an attempt to secure changes at that stage would lead to complications. Consequently he proposed an unprecedented procedure. He proposed to ratify the treaty as it stood, but to stipulate in the instrument of ratification that after the exchange of ratifications the article on Serbia would be modified and that the second secret article would be wholly withdrawn. He proposed this expedient because he was anxious that the treaty should be ratified without delay. He realised that since Alexander could not foresee that the Porte would require changes, he would ratify the treaty as it stood. If he were to insist that Russia should accede to the changes he required immediately, Chichagov would be compelled to apply for a new set of ratifications. Mahmud feared that if this were permitted to happen, Alexander would resort to delay and the exchange of the ratifications would be postponed indefinitely. It was his intention to induce Chichagov to agree to the proposed changes without reference to his government.[73]

The conduct of the Ottoman government did not conform to Mahmud's

stated intentions. The ministers drew up the ratifications in six different versions, and, through Ahmed Paşa, instructed Galib Efendi to produce, in the first instance, that version which made provision for the modification of the article on Serbia. In one version not only was article VIII ratified in its original form, but the two separate and secret articles were incorporated into the patent treaty and ratified.[74] This would imply that in the last resort Mahmud was prepared to accept both the patent treaty and the separate and secret articles in their original forms. Yet, these ratifications were accompanied by a positive declaration from Mahmud that he would make no concessions whatsoever on the Asiatic side. On 16 June Ahmed Paşa instructed Galib Efendi to exchange the ratifications of both the patent treaty in its original form and those of the separate and secret articles without delay. He feared that delay would give rise to new complications. Yet, before Galib Efendi could act upon these instructions he modified them and directed the former to exchange the ratifications only of the patent treaty in its original form, and to obtain a written engagement from Chichagov to the effect that Russia agreed to modify the article on Serbia. If the Russians refused to countenance such a procedure, Galib Efendi was to apply for new instructions. Ahmed Paşa himself intended to refer to the Sultan.[75]

Meanwhile the Ottomans endeavoured to secure Russian agreement for the changes they required. Ahmed Paşa tentatively raised the subject of the second secret article with Italinsky at Schumla, but the latter dismissed it as unimportant. Ahmed Paşa refrained from pressing the issue because he feared that he might provide Italinsky with an excuse for raising the question of an alliance.[76] On 25 June he made a direct appeal to Chichagov, arguing that his desire to promote peace had placed him in a false position and requesting, as a favour, that he should consent to renounce the second secret article. He further intimated that Mahmud required the removal of the provision regarding the fixing of the Serbian dues, and he requested that Chichagov should accede to it. He declared that the ratifications sent from Istanbul ratified the treaty in the modified form that Mahmud required.[77]

Chichagov refused to accommodate Ahmed Paşa. During an interview with Galib Efendi on 28 June he peremptorily refused to consent to any modification of the article on Serbia. Consequently Galib Efendi decided to abandon this demand, and, to Chichagov's astonishment, produced the version of the ratifications which had ratified the article on Serbia in its original form. Chichagov, however, refused to proceed to the exchange of the ratifications. In view of Mahmud's outright rejection of the second secret article, he decided to refer the question to Alexander and to defer the exchange of the ratifications until the arrival of his reply.[78]

Although Chichagov refused to countenance any modification of article VIII, he told Galib Efendi that so long as the security of the Serbians was assured, the Porte could do what it liked. Galib Efendi himself was not opposed to the ratification of the VIIIth article as it stood. He observed that under this article the only engagement that the Porte contracted towards Russia was to grant a general amnesty. Everything else was to be settled in consultation with the Serbians. As the latter were the Porte's rayah subjects, Russia had no right to interfere, and the Porte could arrange matters as it saw fit.[79]

Meanwhile Stratford Canning intervened in order to dissuade the Russians from pressing for an alliance, and in order to induce them to renounce the second separate and secret article. Canning was at first under the impression that Russia would make the formation of an alliance a *sine qua non* and was prepared to press the Porte to agree to it. When he realised that the Russians would not make it a condition of peace, he readily acceded to the Ottoman request that he should write to Italinsky to urge that Russia should not press for an alliance and that she should renounce the second secret article. Canning explained his motives for intervention in the following terms:

> I thought it really of consequence if possible to dissuade the Russians from insisting upon the Article respecting the Phasis, not only because the Porte so strongly objected to it, but in order to show His Majesty's regard for Persia, and thereby to strengthen our interests in that quarter, as well as to put an additional check upon the progress of the Russian arms on the side of Georgia, to facilitate the re-establishment of Peace between that Power and Persia, and to make the same event, when once accomplished, between the former and this Court more cordial & lasting.[80]

Thus Canning's intervention was partly motivated by his desire to arrest Russia's southward advance, for this affected Britain's relations with Persia.

Canning also raised the subject with the Russian councillor of state, Bulgakov, who arrived in Istanbul on 12 June. Chichagov had sent Bulgakov ostensibly to inspect the Russian prisoners of war, but his real mission was to co-operate with Canning in promoting the idea of a Russo-Ottoman alliance, and to obtain the Porte's permission for the passage of Russian troops through Ottoman territory to the Dalmatian coast for the duration of the war with Napoleon. Chichagov gave similar instructions to Admiral Greig, an Englishman in Russian service, who had arrived in Istanbul at about the same time. Chichagov had intended to send Italinsky to Istanbul, but the Grand Vezir refused to permit his passage before the ratification of the treaty.[81]

Canning told Bulgakov that the second secret article was a major obstacle to the ratification of the treaty. The Porte could not accept an article which was so detrimental to the interests of a friendly power – Persia – without exposing itself to the just reproaches of that power. He admitted that, as the representative of a power in alliance with Persia, he shared the Porte's uneasiness about the implications of this article. Bulgakov disingeneously argued that the anticipated adverse effects of the article on Turco-Persian relations could be avoided by concealing the article from Persia. He added tht the Porte had acknowledged Russia's need for communications along the Phasis by according her this right before the war. Moreover, the supposition that the munitions conveyed to Georgia would be used against Persia was without foundation. Canning suggested that the objections of the Ottoman ministers might be overcome by stating in the article of the treaty of Bucharest which referred to Persia that Russia would make peace with Persia on the basis of the *status quo ad presentum*[82] a proposition which revealed ignorance

of the Persian position. He thought that the first objective of British and Russian diplomacy should be to secure the ratification of the treaty and believed that the Russian proposal for an alliance was premature. Moreover, he was convinced that if at a future date the Porte agreed to an alliance with Russia, it would not be without the adhesion of Britain. He was convinced that the common cause (which was to defeat Napoleon) would be best served by Italinsky's presence in Istanbul, and at a conference with Mazhar Efendi he pressed the Porte to clarify its attitude towards Russia and thereby secured permission for Italinsky to proceed to Istanbul.

Canning's intervention was unsuccessful. The Russians were not prepared to give up the advantages they had secured after prolonged negotiations. In fact Chichagov believed that the opposition to Russia's use of Kemhal and the Phasis route came not so much from the Ottomans as from the British. He believed that the British were putting pressure on Sultan Mahmud to withdraw the second secret article because they feared that once Russia was established beyond the Caucasus she would become a threat to the security of India.[83] This intervention was the last significant act of Canning's ministry in Istanbul. His successor, Robert Liston, arrived at Istanbul on 28 June.[84]

Canning has been lauded by contemporaries and historians alike for his part in promoting the settlement between Russia and the Porte at a very critical juncture. Indeed, his biographer, Stanley Lane-Poole, gives the impression that the conclusion of the treaty was wholly due to his exertions. He wrote: 'The skilful manner in which he had by indomitable patience and clear foresight, brought about the end so sincerely desired by all the enemies of France, was not at once understood'.[85] He also pointed out that during his period of office as Foreign Secretary, the Marquis Wellesley had taken no notice of Ottoman affairs and that despite Canning's insistent demands that the Foreign Office should show some 'signs of life', he had never sent Canning any instructions.[86]

Contemporaries and historians alike have claimed too much for Canning. While it is true that during the two years in which he acted as minister plenipotentiary Canning received no instructions, this was not unusual. Charles Arbuthnot had not received instructions for a comparable length of time at an equally critical period. Moreover, the course Canning was to pursue had been clearly delineated in the instructions of George Canning (June 1808) and Lord Bathurst (November 1809) to Adair, Canning's predecessor at Istanbul. Acting upon these, Adair had already established indirect contact with the Russian government. Canning simply maintained this contact, and at the appropriate time he took the logical step of entering into direct communication with the Russians. His influence in the making of the treaty of Bucharest was not as extensive as has been claimed. The argument that he exercised a predominant influence presupposes that the Ottomans did not have a policy of their own, that they were amenable to foreign influence, and that therefore their policies were moulded by the representatives of the Great Powers. It should be manifest from the foregoing account that the Ottomans had definite policies of their own, which they pursued without deviation, regardless of foreign advice. Their dominant, inalterable objective was to preserve the integrity of the Ottoman Empire.

The fact that in 1812 they consented to the cession of some territory as a price of peace was due to their apprehension that if they became involved in the wider European conflict, they stood to lose more, and not to the influence of Canning. In fact they were suspicious of all foreign interference.[87] The only occasions on which they invited Canning's intervention were when they sought to apply pressure on the Russians to moderate their demands. Canning's work gives the appearance of having influenced Ottoman policy simply because the course he advocated happened to coincide with that pursued by the Ottomans. It is doubtful whether Canning had any influence on Russian policy either. The terms Russia finally accepted were substantially different from what she had demanded at the outset of the negotiations. The concessions she made, however, were due to her predicament in 1812 and not to Canning's influence.

Liston[87] continued the arguments against pressing the Ottomans for an alliance from the point Canning had left them, but he made little impression upon the Russians. In discussion with Italinsky he declared that the Shah of Persia was alarmed by the concession which would give Russia free access through the Phasis route, and he admitted that the British minister in Persia had engaged to watch over Persian interests. This convinced Italinsky that Britain was as much opposed to the grant of free access to Russia as the Porte. His distrust of Britain was increased when Liston stated that Britain could not co-operate with Russia in the execution of the projected diversionary attack in the Adriatic because she had no disposable forces. Earlier Sir Robert Wilson, who had been sent to Istanbul by the British government as a military observer, had informed Italinsky that Britain had a strong squadron in the Adriatic. When Liston enquired how, on the assumption that the Russian diversionary attack was executed, Russia would dispose of any gains she might make in Dalmatia, Italinsky concluded that the British were reluctant to support Russia in the Adriatic because they suspected her intentions.[88]

Meanwhile Alexander emphasised the importance of an alliance with the Porte. He believed that peace with the Porte would give Russia a great advantage in the struggle against France, but in his view an alliance alone could compensate Russia for abandoning her close relations with the Serbians and the other Slav nations. He was anxious that some means should be found to preserve his close ties with the Serbians and the Porte's other Slav subjects, and suggested that if an alliance could be formed, instead of making a military contribution itself, the Porte should be persuaded to permit these nations to act in co-operation with Russia.[89]

Chichagov shared Alexander's views. On 29 June he sent Italinsky urgent instructions. He argued that Alexander had agreed to peace because he wanted an alliance. Without an alliance the peace would be illusory. Under the prevailing circumstances neutrality was impermissible: those who were not Russia's friends were her enemies. The Porte should permit the passage of Russian troops to the Dalmatian coast, or this would be effected in spite of it. Delay or hesitation were inadmissible. Italinsky should enlist Liston's support and if the Porte did not yield they should threaten a rupture.[90]

As the future of Russo-Ottoman relations remained uncertain, the military

schemes of Chichagov assumed increasingly fantastic proportions. On 8th July he wrote to Alexander urging that he should be permitted to undertake the Dalmatian expedition with or without Ottoman consent. Three days later he developed a plan for attacking Istanbul and solicited Alexander's authorisation for its execution. He believed that he could reach Istanbul almost without striking a blow, and that once there he could dictate his terms. His subordinates, however, ridiculed his plan, and General Langeron sent Alexander a memorandum pointing out its impracticability.[91] Under the prevailing circumstances Alexander himself considered Chichagov's plan too hazardous and ordered Chichagov to abandon it.[92]

Meanwhile Count Rumyantsev proposed an expedient for overcoming the difficulties posed by the Porte's refusal to ratify the second secret article. He proposed that the ratifications of the patent treaty should be exchanged and that an ambiguous reservation should be made regarding the secret articles. This could be effected by Chichagov writing to the Grand Vezir stating that the Emperor wished to be on amicable terms with the Porte, and that as the treaty was already perfect in his eyes, the ratifications could be exchanged. They could subsequently renew the discussion of the secret articles, which could be increased in number, and complete the peace. In a passage remarkable for its studied duplicity, he emphasised the importance of ambiguous phraseology:

> Il me parait, sire, essentiel de placer ces mots, *ce qui déjà constitue parfaitement la paix* et parlant des articles secrets les citer, comme *devant compléter la paix* parce que c'est cette sorte de réservation indirecte qui vous donnera, sire, la faculté de l'interprêter à votre gré.[93]

Rumyansev did not underestimate the importance of an immediate settlement with the Porte, and suggested that in the last resort, if the Ottomans absolutely insisted on the complete abandonment of the secret articles, Chichagov should be empowered to make this concession. He also hoped that it would not be necessary for Chichagov to compromise the article referring to Serbia, for it was important that in time of peace Russia should not abandon a people that had revolted and sought her protection.

In his letter to the Grand Vezir of 14 July announcing his readiness to exchange the ratifications of the patent treaty, Chichagov duly reproduced Rumyansev's equivocal phrases.[94] The ratifications were finally exchanged on 15th July. Chichagov took the view that as the Porte raised objections to the second secret article and refused to ratify it, the burden of initiating discussions on the subject rested with it. Meanwhile he ordered Richelieu, the governor of the Crimea, to evacuate the areas on the Asiatic frontier that were restored to the Porte, but to concentrate a small number of troops in the coastal area reserved for Russia's use by the rejected article. He believed that he was within his rights to suspend the evacuation of this area until a definitive arrangement could be reached.[95]

With the Porte's refusal to ratify the separate and secret articles, not only the objectionable second article but also article I lapsed. This article stipulated the demolition of the fortresses of Ismail and Kilia on the left bank of the

Danube and prohibited the building of new fortifications in the area. The Ottomans were, however, indifferent whether the fortresses of Ismail and Kilia were demolished or allowed to stand. Thus the treaty of Bucharest as finally ratified more or less conformed to Ottoman wishes, though the Sultan seems to have been disappointed that Galib Efendi had not been able to secure the modification of the article on Serbia.

The Ottomans had been obliged to negotiate with the Russians under the impact of a severe military setback and their first thought had been to gain time in order to improve their military position, but soon they had come to consider peace as a matter of absolute necessity. They were convinced that any involvement in the wider European conflict would be detrimental to their interests, so they were determined to pursue a policy of neutrality. They considered it important to terminate the war with Russia before the outbreak of Franco-Russian hostilities, lest they be drawn involuntarily into the wider conflict. Napoleon's promises held no attraction for them: their past experiences had made them deeply mistrustful of Napoleon and immune to his promises. They also realised that an alliance with France would entail a rupture with Britain, and this they were not prepared to accept. If it came to a choice between Britain and France, they preferred the friendship of Britain to that of France, for not only did they fear British naval power, but they also knew that of all the Great Powers Britain alone had not schemed their destruction. On the other hand they were unwilling to form an alliance with Russia, not only because this would involve them in a war with France and her allies from which they stood to gain nothing, but also because they considered Russia as their inveterate enemy. Hence it is misleading to argue that Stratford Canning had a significant influence on the outcome of the Russo-Ottoman negotiations, for the Ottomans were determined to make peace of their own volition, while the Russians were obliged to make peace by approach of their conflict with the French.

The treaty of Bucharest was of immense significance for it gave Russia the immediate advantage of concentrating her forces against the French, thus contributing to the ultimate defeat of France, and it enabled the Ottomans to extricate themselves from a potentially disastrous war with but a slight loss of territory. It was further significant because it became the basis of future Russo-Ottoman relations. In the years following its conclusion, the different interpretations placed on some of its articles, and the mutual Ottoman and Russian complaints regarding the non-observance or the partial observance of its stipulations kept Russo-Ottoman relations continually strained. Between 1816 and 1821 it formed the subject of extensive, but fruitless, negotiations between the Ottomans and Russians. What the Russians were unable to secure by negotiations they imposed upon the Ottomans at Akkerman (1826) under the threat of war. They finally and irrevocably enforced the acceptance of their harsh terms by going to war with the Ottomans and then dictating the treaty of Adrianople (1829).

NOTES

1. This article has been extracted from my Ph.D. thesis, 'The diplomatic relations of the Ottoman Empire and the Great European Powers, 1806–1821,' London, 1975. I am greatly obliged to the Governing Body of the School of Oriental and African Studies for awarding me a Postgraduate Exhibition for three consecutive years from 1971 to 1974; and to the Central Research Fund whose financial assistance enabled me to carry out some research in Istanbul in 1973.
2. The French had prevented the Ottoman representative from attending the peace conferences at Amiens, and the Ottomans were obliged to conclude the separate Peace of Paris with the French (1802).
3. Although the *Hatt-ı Şerif* was in the form of a firman, it was regarded as a binding convention because it has been issued at the instance of Russia and officially notified to her.
4. Alexander to Kamensky, 15/27 Dec., 1806, *Vneshnyaya Politika Rossii XIX i nachla XX veka,* 1st series, Moscow, 1960–1972, III, 439–41. Hereafter cited as *VPR.*
5. Budberg to Pozzo di Borgo, 12/24 March, 1807, Public Record Office, London, Foreign Office Papers, 65 (Russia)/72, Hereafter cited as PRO.FO.
6. Ahmed Cevdet Paşa, *Tarih-i Cevdet, Tertib-i Cedid,* 12 vols., Istanbul, the 1309/1891–92 ed., X, 6–9; Jorga, N., *Geschichte des Osmanischen Reiches,* 5 vols., Gotha, 1913, V, 205.
7. Ahmed Paşa to the Kaymakam, 29 N. 1226/15 Nov., 1811, Başbakanlık Arşivi, Istanbul, Hatt-ı Hümayun Tasnifi, no. 41697. Hereafter abbreviated as Bşb. Ar. H.H. As the Turkish documents are dated according to the Muslim calendar, it has been found convenient to give dates according to both the Muslim and the Gregorian calendars. The names of the months of the Muslim calendar have been abbreviated in a transliterated form, thus: M. Muharrem, S. Safer, Ra. Rebiyülevvel, R. Rebiyülâhir, Ca. Cemaziyelevvel, C. Cemaziyelâhir, B. Receb, S. Şaban, N. Ramazan, L. Şevval, Za. Zilkade, and Z. Zilhicce.
8. Ledoulx was the French agent in Bucharest.
9. Ledoulx to Mosloy, 26 Oct., 1811, *Documente privitóre la Istoria Românilor,* gen. ed. E. de Hurmuzaki, supl. I, vol II, Odobescu, A.I. (ed.), no. 830; Kutuzov to Ahmed Paşa, 7/19 and 10/22 Oct., 1811, Bşb. Ar. H.H. 443631 and 443363H; Yakschitch, G., *L'Europe et la Résurrection de la Serbie, 1804–1834,* Paris, 1917, 235.
10. *Ibid.,* 235–36.
11. Kutuzov to Ahmed Paşa, 12/24 Oct., 1811, Bşb. Ar. H.H. 44363J.
12. To Ahmed Paşa, 27 L. 1226/13 Nov., 1811, Bşb. Ar. H.H.41284D.
13. Ottoman negotiators to the Grand Vezir, 14 L. 1226/1 Nov., 1811, Bşb. Ar. H.H.48249; Ulyanitsky, V.A., *Materialui k istorii vostochnago voprosa v. 1811–1813,* Moscow, 1901, 1–2. The Ottoman accounts of the negotiations are extremely detailed; the accounts printed by Ulyanitsky are summaries.
14. Ottoman negotiators to the Grand Vezir, 15 L. 1226/2 Nov., 1811, Bşb. Ar. H.H.48247; Ulyanitsky, *op. cit.,* 2–3.
15. Ottoman negotiators to the Grand Vezir, 18 L. 1226/4 Nov., 1811, Bşb. Ar. H.H.48244; Ulyanitsky, *op. cit.,* 4–8.
16. Ottoman negotiators to the Grand Vezir, 27 L. 1226/13 Nov., 1811, Bşb. Ar. H.H.41284D.
17. A *telhis* (or report) submitted to the Sultan, undated but probably Aug., 1804, Bşb. Ar. H.H.44640A.
18. Note from Italinsky to the Porte, 29 May/10 June, 1805, *VPR,* III, 444–45.
19. The *telhis* referred to above.
20. Italinsky's note referred to above.
21. Galib Efendi to the Grand Vezir, 27 L. 1226/13 Nov., 1811, Bşb. Ar. H.H.41284C.
22. Ottoman negotiators to the Grand Vezir, 19 and 21 L. 1226/5 and 7 Nov., 1811, Bşb. Ar. H.H.44245 and 48242; Ulyanitsky, *op. cit.,* 8–18.
23. *Ibid.,* 20–30; Ottoman negotiators to the Grand Vezir, 2 Za. 1226/17 Nov., 1811, Bşb. Ar. H.H.48246.
24. Ulyanitsky, *op. cot.,* 30–36; Ottoman plenipotentiaries to the Grand Vezir, 17 Za. 1226/2 Dec., 1811, Bşb. Ar. H.H.41330A.
25. The Şeyhülislâm's fetva, Bşb. Ar. H.H.44512B.
26. A summary of Latour-Maubourg's communication, Bşb. Ar. H.H.421274.
27. *Telhis* submitted to the Sultan by the Kaymakam, Bşb. Ar. H.H.44484.

28. Galib Efendi to the Grand Vezir, 17 Za. 1226/2 Dec., 1811, Bşb. Ar. H.H.41330A.
29. Ottoman plenipotentiaries to the Grand Vezir, 23 Za. 1226/8 Dec., 1811, Bşb. Ar. H.H.41330C; Alex, M.A.L.F., *Précis de l'histoire de l'empire Ottoman,* 3 vols, Paris, 1824, III, 441.
30. Ottoman plenipotentiaries to the Grand Vezir, 1 M. 1227/15 Jan., 1812, Bşb. Ar. H.H.41825A; Ulyanitsky, *op. cit.,* 37–43.
31. Kutuzov to the Grand Vezir, and the Ottoman plenipotentiaries to the Grand Vezir, 1/13 Jan., 1812 and 1 M. 1227/15 Jan. 1812, Bşb. Ar. H.H. 41825 and 41825A respectively.
32. The Grand Vezir to the plenipotentiaries, 15 M. 1227/29 Jan., 1812; to the Kaymakam 17 M. 1227/31 Jan. 1812; and to Kutuzov 19 M. 1227/2 Feb., 1812, Bşb. Ar. H.H. 41825D, 41737 and 41817 respectively.
33. Galib Efendi to the Grand Vezir, 1 M. 1227/15 Jan., 1812, Bşb. Ar. H.H.41591A.
34. Cevdet, *op. cit.,* X, 17–18; Ataullah, Şanizade Mehmed, *Tarih-i Şanizade,* 4 vols., Istanbul 1290/1873–1291/1874, II, 97–100.
35. *Ibid.*
36. Bşb. Ar. H.H.14203.
37. *Telhis* submitted to the Sultan by the Kaymakam, Bşb. Ar. H44512D.
38. Ottoman plenipotentiaries to the Grand Vezir, 5 Ra. 1227/18 March, 1812, Bşb. Ar. H.H.41833.
39. Canning to Wellesley, 21 Feb., 1812, PRO.FO. 78/77, no. 7.
40. Enclosure to Canning's no. 7.
41. Champagny to Latour-Maubourg, 10 Aug., 1810, Odobescu, *op. cit.,* no. 754.
42. Coquelle, P., 'Latour-Maubourg, Chargé d'affaires à Constantinople, 1809 sic – 1812', *Revue d'Histoire Diplomatique,* 1905, 590–93.
43. *Ibid.,* 598–600.
44. *Ibid.,* 601–602.
45. *Ibid.,* 602–604.
46. *Ibid.,* 602.
47. The Grand Vezir to the Kaymakam, Bşb. Ar. Cevdet Tasnifi, (Hariciye), 4361.
48. The Kaymakam to the Grand Vezir, undated, Bşb. Ar. H.H.14214.
49. Ottoman plenipotentiaries to the Grand Vezir, 5 Ra. 1227/18 March 1812, Bşb. Ar. H.H.41833.
50. Ottoman plenipotentiaries to the Grand Vezir, 4 Ra. 1227/17 March, 1812, Bşb. Ar. H.H.44407F; Kutuzov to the Grand Vezir, 4/16 March, 1812, Bşb. Ar. H.H.41833B.
51. In the Ottoman documents this person is simply referred to as 'the Swedish private secretary'; Ledoulx refers to him as 'Horn', but Coquelle refers to him as 'Humel'.
52. The Grand Vezir to the Kaymakam, 3 R. 1227/15 Ap., 1812, Bşb. Ar. H.H.41832.
53. Account of the conference with Palin, 24 Ra. 1227/6 Ap., 1812, Bşb. Ar. H.H.41817.
54. Canning to Wellesley, 12 and 21 Ap., 1812, PRO.FO. 78/77, no. 14 and unnumbered, in cypher; the Kaymakam to the Grand Vezir, 13 R. 1227/25 Ap., 1812, Bşb. Ar. H.H.41326; the Grand Vezir to the Kaymakam, 21 Ra. 1227/3 Ap., 1812, Bşb. Ar. H.H.41814.
55. The Grand Vezir to Galib Efendi, 18 Ra. 1227/31 March, 1812, Bşb. Ar. H.H.44418D.
56. Ottoman plenipotentiaries to the Grand Vezir, 3 R. 1227/15 Ap., 1812, Bşb. Ar. H.H.44407.
57. As above, and Ottoman plenipotentiaries to the Grand Vezir 13 R. 1227/25 Ap., 1812, Bşb. Ar. H.H.44418C.
58. Ottoman plenipotentiaries to the Grand Vezir, 21 Ca. 1227/1 June, 1812, Bşb. Ar. H.H.44318B.
59. Ottoman plenipotentiaries to the Grand Vezir, 25 R. 1227/7 May, 1812, Bşb. Ar. H.H.44418G.
60. Instructions to the plenipotentiaries, 19 R. 1227/1 May, 1812, Bşb. Ar. H.H.40820.
61. The Grand Vezir to Galib Efendi, 27 R. 1227/9 May, 1812, Bşb. Ar. H.H.44421B.
62. As above, and the Grand Vezir to the Kaymakam, 29 R. 1227/12 May, 1812, Bşb. Ar. H.H.44358.
63. The Grand Vezir to Galib Efendi, 9 Ca. 1227/20 May, 1812, Bşb. Ar. H.H.41254; Ulyanitsky, *op. cit.,* 50–52.
64. Chichagov, P., *Mémoires de l'amiral Paul Tchitcgagof,* ed. C. Gr. Lahovary, (Paris /Bucharest, 1909), 359–60, 379.
65. *Ibid.,* 379; Galib Efendi to the Grand Vezir, 9 Ca. 1227/21 May, 1812, Bşb. Ar. H.H.41293.

66. The French text of the treaty of Bucharest, including the separate and secret articles, is printed in *VPR,* 406–417; the Turkish text, without the separate and secret articles is printed in *Muahedat Mecmuası,* 5 vols, Istanbul, 1294/1877–1298/1881, IV, 49–57.

67. Goriainow, S., *Le Bosphore et les Dardanelles,* Paris, 1910, 24; Mouravieff, B., *L'Alliance Russo-Turque au milieu des Guerres Napoléoniennes,* Neuchatel, 1954, 320–22.

68. The Turkish text is printed in *Muahedat Mecmuası,* IV, 46. The argument that article 7 accorded Russia free passage in every instance is refuted by Hurewitz, J. C., 'Russia and the Turkish Straits: A Revaluation of the Origins of the Problem', *World Politics,* XIV, 1961–62, 605–32. Muraviev ingeniously argued that as under art. XI of the treaty of the Dardenelles the Ottomans were already engaged to exclude all foreign warships from the Straits, they sought to evade the obligation to admit Russian warships by referring in the Turkish text of article 3 to the renewal only of former peace treaties, whereas the Russian text mentioned all treaties, conventions etc., *op. cit.,* 320–22. In fact the Turkish original is a literal translation of the French version adopted by the Russians. It is Noradoungian's translation of the Turkish original (which Muraviev uses) which is inaccurate.

69. The Kaymakam to the Grand Vezir, 9 Ca. 1227/20 May, 1812, Bşb. Ar. H.H.41286A.

70. The Grand Vezir to the Kaymakam, 17 Ca. 1227/28 May, 1812, Bşb. Ar. H.H.44319.

71. The Grand Vezir to the Kaymakam, 15 C. 1227/25 June, 1812, Bşb. Ar. H.H.44367.

72. *Telhis* submitted to the Sultan, Bşb. Ar. H.H.42233; instructions addressed to the Grand Vezir, undated, Bşb. Ar. H.H.44366A; *telhis* submitted to the Sultan, Bşb. Ar. H.H.42232; the Kaymakam to the Grand Vezir, 6 B. 1227/15 July, 1812, H.H.41336A.

73. The Grand Vezir to the Kaymakam, 15 C. 1227/25 June, 1812, Bşb. Ar. H.H.44367; the Grand Vezir to Galib Efendi, 11 B. 1227/20 July, 1812, Bşb. Ar. H.H.41336C.

74. Bşb. Ar. H.H.44374. There was another version which also ratified both the patent and the secret articles, Bşb. Ar. H.H.42119.

75. The Grand Vezir to Galib Efendi, Bşb. Ar. H.H.44420B and 44412C.

76. The Grand Vezir to the Kaymakam, 15 C. 1227/25 June, 1812, Bşb. Ar. H.H.44367.

77. The Grand Vezir to Chichagov, 15 C. 1227/25 June, 1812, Bşb. Ar. H.H.44412G.

78. Chichagov to the Grand Vezir, Ulyanitsky, *op. cit.,* 75.

79. Galib Efendi to the Grand Vezir, 19 B. 1227/28 July, 1812, Bşb. Ar. H.H.44421.

80. Canning to Castlereagh, 12 June, 1812, PRO.FO. 78/77, no. 6.

81. Chichagov, *Mémoires,* 393–95.

82. Bulgakov to Chichagov, 5/17 June, 1812, *VPR,* VI, 432–35.

83. Chichagov, *Mémoires,* 398; Chichagov to Italinsky, 17/29 June, 1812, Ulyanitsky, *op. cit.,* 72–74.

84. Liston's appointment as ambassador had been announced as early as March 1811, but owing to Wellesley's uncertainty about the future course of events his departure was postponed indefinitely. He was despatched to Istanbul by Castlereagh shortly after the latter had succeeded Wellesley at the Foreign Office, with instructions to facilitate a settlement between Russia and the Porte in every possible way, though without sacrificing British interests. Webster has ascribed the delay which occured between his appointment and his departure for Istanbul to Wellesley's incompetence and to Liston's dilatoriness (*op. cit.,* I, 86). It is abundantly clear from the Liston papers at the National Library of Scotland in Edinburgh (esp. MSS. 5618 and 5658) that the charge of dilatoriness levelled against Liston is totally without foundation.

85. *The Life of Stratford Canning,* 2 vols., (London, 1888), I, 175.

86. *Ibid.,* 176. C. K. Webster was also laudatory. He wrote: 'Though the real author of the treaty of Bucharest was Napoleon, whose threatened attack forced the necessary concessions from the Tsar, yet the courage, energy, persistence, and resource of Canning under the most difficult circumstances will always remain on record as a fitting prelude to the career of the greatest British Ambassador of the nineteenth century'. He also grossly overestimated the importance of Canning's intervention. He wrote: 'Without Stratford Canning's mediation, therefore, it is doubtful if peace could have been made until the news of Napoleon's invasion had reached Constantinople, and then it might never have been made, with incalculable consequences on the whole campaign'. Quotations from *The Foreign Policy of Castlereagh,* London, 1931, I, 88 and 86–7 respectively.

87. Although on one occasion the Sultan made an exception of Canning, subsequently he sought pretexts for ending his interference and declared that as he was acting without instructions, Canning could be ignored, see Bşb. Ar. H.H.42133.

88. Italinsky to Chichagov, 5/7 July, 1812, *VPR,* VI, 477–82; Liston to Castlereagh, 18 July, 1812, PRO.FO. 78/79, no. 3.
89. Alexander to Chichagov, Wilna, 13/25 May, 1812, in *Mémoires de l'Amiral Tchitchagoff (1767–1849),* Leipzig ed., 1862, 76–9.
90. Ulyanitsky, *op. cit.,* 72–4.
91. Yakschitch, *op. cit.,* 254–55.
93. Chichagov, *Mémoires,* Lahovary ed., 390.
93. Rumyantsev to Alexander, 23 June/5 July, 1812, *VPR,* VI, 452–53.
94. Bşb. Ar. H.H.44372C.
95. Chichagov to Italinsky, 22 July/3 Aug., 1812, *VPR,* VI, 524–26.