

The Caliph and Mujtahids: Ottoman Policy towards the Shiite Community of Iraq in the Late Nineteenth Century

GÖKHAN ÇETINSAYA

A significant number of Arabic-speaking Shiite Muslims lived in the Iraqi provinces of Baghdad and Basra. The exact numbers of these Shiite Muslims is unclear since the Ottoman government kept no such statistics. Nonetheless, it is clear that they formed the absolute majority of the population in the two provinces.¹ Furthermore, throughout the nineteenth century, there appears to have been a growth in this Shiite population at the expense of the Sunni sect, as the former expanded through conversion.² To the Ottoman authorities, the presence of a large and growing Shiite population in Iraq represented a serious political problem. The Ottoman Empire was a Sunni state, with which its Shiite subjects could not be trusted to identify. Nor, in principle, did Shiite Muslims recognize the Ottoman claim to possession of the Great Islamic Caliphate, a claim which Sultan Abdülhamid II (1876–1909) repeatedly emphasized in an effort to give religious legitimacy to his regime. In short, the Shiites were regarded as potentially disloyal. ①

The problem also had international dimensions. Iraq bordered on Iran, a Shiite state which had historical and religious claims there, and which, in the course of centuries, had fought numerous wars with the Ottoman Empire for the possession of Iraq. Even in the second part of the nineteenth century, at a time when the Iranian state was internationally weak, the Ottoman authorities retained a strong sense that Iran might pose a military threat, especially in the event of a Russian invasion of Anatolia. In addition, the question of the delimitation of the Ottoman–Iranian border remained a constant source of tension.³ There was also constant communication between Iraq and Iran. Iraq contained the most sacred Shiite shrines, located at Najaf, Karbala, Kazimayn and Samarra, collectively known as the Atabat. In the eighteenth century, the Atabat became a centre for the *Usuli* school of Shiite jurisprudence, which argued for a political role for the ulama; and the Atabat retained their primacy as a centre of religious authority throughout the nineteenth century.⁴ Most of the important Shiite mujtahids (jurisconsults) either resided and taught there, or studied there for a time before returning to Iran. Together with these mujtahids, a large number of *mollas*, *akhunds*, and students resided in the Atabat.⁵ First in the Tobacco Protest of 1891–92, and later from 1902 onwards, and especially, during the years of the Iranian Constitutional Revolution (1905–11), the mujtahids of the Atabat became actively involved in Iranian politics. In addition, there were many Iranian subjects at the Atabat: religious students,

merchants, and pilgrims. Every year a significant number of people, from Iran, and India, visited the shrine cities of Iraq, or brought the remains of their relatives to bury at the Atabat.⁶

The British, too, had links with the Atabat. Not only did numerous Shiites from British India visit and reside at the Atabat, but the British government had direct links with the mujtahids through the Oudh Bequest. The bequest had been established by the King of Oudh of India, and provided for the annual distribution of alms for charitable purposes at the Atabat. Following Oudh's annexation by the British government of India in the 1850s, control over the bequest had passed into British hands, and the annual distribution of funds was conducted by the British Consul-General at Baghdad, through two selected mujtahids, one at Najaf and one at Karbala.⁷ For these favoured mujtahids, the bequest was a major source of local influence and prestige, and indirectly, it was a potential channel for British influence, too. There were also other funds, from Iran and India, which were donated to the Atabat. The Iranian Government, for example, made annual grants to the shrines at Karbala, Najaf and Kazimayn.⁸

Since the Shiite ulama enjoyed great prosperity and wealth through the Oudh bequest and other donations, they exercised much influence in Iraq, especially among the tribes. It appears that through well-established madrasas in the cities, and through *akhunds*, Shiite mollahs who wandered among the tribal population, the Shiite sect expanded in the region. Given the fact that mujtahids distributed an important amount of money to religious students and the poor, it comes as no surprise that some of the tribesmen, especially the newly settled ones, and also some small town-dwellers were attracted to Shiism.⁹ On the other hand, there is some evidence of a decline in the Sunni establishments in Iraq in the second half of the nineteenth century. As a result of the Tanzimat's centralization policies, the revenues of the *waqf* lands which had hitherto supported the Sunni madrasas and ulama were gradually taken over by the government. The consequent reduction of financial means weakened Sunni religious education.¹⁰

The growth of Shiism among the tribal population was known to the Porte before Abdülhamid's period, though it was not regarded with the same seriousness as it would be later.¹¹ During Midhat Paşa's governor-generalship (1869–72), the extent of the problem was clearly seen, provoking serious concern on the part of the Ottoman authorities.¹² It appears that this concern soon subsided, however, and for about 15 years the Ottoman government paid little attention to the issue; it is, for example, noteworthy that few of the reports on Iraqi affairs submitted to Abdülhamid before 1885 mention the Shiite problem.¹³ From 1885 onwards, the attitude changed, and reports persistently emphasized the growth of Shiism in the region. All these reports alarmed the Hamidian regime in the late 1880s and early 1890s, prompting the Palace to embark upon a serious consideration of the Shiite issue.¹⁴ Various measures were taken in order to forestall the growth of the Shiite sect. A number of commissions were sent to the region; local officials were asked to write detailed reports on the subject; some steps were taken in the field of education. However, nothing substantial resulted from all the effort undertaken.¹⁵

At the same time, from the mid-1880s onwards, Sultan Abdülhamid seems to have begun to discuss the idea of a Sunni–Shiite rapprochement as a long-term solution to the Shiite problem in Iraq. In late August 1886, it appears, Abdülhamid consulted

Mirza Hasan Shaikh al-Rais, an important Iranian dissident, residing in Istanbul, through two of his confidants, Cevdet Paşa and Yusuf Rıza Paşa.¹⁶ According to their account, Shaikh al-Rais showed every inclination and desire for the Sultan's proposal (removal of the enmity [*adavet*] between the Shiites and Sunnis), and wanted to write a pamphlet (*risale*) and communicate with the Iranian mujtahids for the purpose.¹⁷

Abdülhamid also appears to have asked Cevdet and Rıza Paşas to give their own opinions. In his report, Cevdet Paşa, the celebrated scholar and former Justice Minister, gave his full support to the cause of a Sunni–Shiite unity.¹⁸ After having explained the historical development and present situation of the Shiite sect, Cevdet Paşa elaborated on the idea of Sunni–Shiite unity and alliance (*ittifak ve ittihad*) against the 'tyranny and rule of the Christian states' (*düvel-i nasaranın tagallüb ve tahakkümlerine*), through the respective authorities of the Caliph and the Shiite mujtahids. Cevdet Paşa argued that three conditions must be met: first, the tombs of the *ehl-i beyt* (the Prophet's family) in Madina, which were regarded as very important by Shiites as well as Sunnis, must be repaired, and presents must be sent to them. Second, the Shiite mujtahids of the Atabat must be won over to Sunnism, and therefore to the Ottoman Empire. Third, some public works should be carried out in the Atabat.

In another undated and unsigned report, which appears to have been compiled by Yusuf Rıza Paşa, former Minister to Tehran and a Shiite convert, the writer encouraged the Sultan to seek a Sunni–Shiite rapprochement.¹⁹ After giving an historical background, and explaining the basic principles of the Shiite sect, Yusuf Rıza Paşa described the relationship between the Shiite ulama and the reigning Qajar dynasty, and the ulama's political role in Iran. He stated that the mujtahids' influence was a thousand times more effective in Iran than that of the Shah. That was why the Shah was trying to repair the sacred tombs in the Atabat, and it was due to the mujtahids' opposition that the Russians could not implement European laws in Iran. He argued that most of the mujtahids lived in the Ottoman Empire, and they were able, with a sign, to make people revolt against the Shah in 24 hours, and coerce the Iranian state whatever they wanted. Even the Russians, very well aware of the power of the ulama in Iran, were sending presents, and honouring them in various ways, in order to influence Iranian affairs and at the same time keep the Shiite population of Daghistan quiet. In his opinion, their importance for the Ottoman state was much more than that for the Russians. He argued that although the disagreement between Sunnis and Shiites was very ancient, there had been no hostility to prevent their unity in the early ages of Islam. It was political circumstances which had led to mutual enmity: in the days of Sultan Selim I and Shah Ismail Safavi, because of political conflict between the two states, Shiites had become the *raison d'être* of the Iranian state, while the Ottoman ulama had gone so far as to proclaim Shiites to be infidelity (*küfür*). However, Yusuf Rıza Paşa pointed out: 'At the present time, however, it is a religious obligation for Muslim nations to unite and rise up, on the basis of God's unity (*kelime-i tevhid*), against the tyranny and rule of the Christian states; and, since all of them perceive this point, the capacity for unity and alliance in this direction is becoming apparent among both Sunnis and Shiites.' Yusuf Rıza Paşa then reminded the Sultan that:

So much so that, last year, in accordance with the imperial order, when [I], together with Cevdet Paşa, talked to Prince Shaikh al-Rais (*Şeyhü'l-Reis*) who was then in Istanbul, a total inclination and desire was observed in him for the removal of the coldness between Sunnis and Shiites. I myself, too, observed this inclination and wish among all the Shiite ulama during my travels in Baghdad region.

Yusuf Rıza Paşa finally argued that Sultan Abdülhamid was the most appropriate person for this task, since he was regarded as *Hilafetpenah* and *İmamu'l-Muslimin* by Sunnis, whereas the Shah of Iran had no such authority among Shiites. Unity would be achieved only by the Sultan, and by the mujtahids who held the real power in the Shiite world. Given that the mujtahids lived within the Empire, he argued, it was a holy task for Sultan Abdülhamid to remove this hostility between the two sects. In this respect, he also proposed some measures, similar to those of Cevdet Paşa, to achieve the purpose. Firstly, the repair of the tombs of the *ehl-i beyt* in Madina. Secondly, some improvement works also were to be done in the Atabat. Thirdly, Ottoman authorities would, according to political considerations, invite the Shiite ulama to this task by way of payments and showing honours; but making sure that this last measure will not be at the expense of the Sunni ulama, and a balanced and just policy between Sunni and Shiite ulama should be implemented in this regard.²⁰

There followed a series of correspondence among the Sultan, the military establishment, and the (present or former) local officials, on the issue of Shiite presence in the 6th Army at Iraq, as well as the other dimensions of Shiite threat in Iraq.²¹ As a result, in mid-1890, a Committee of Military Inspection was dispatched to Iraq for a general investigation.²² While the committee was in Iraq, the Sultan also continued to consult the ulama both in the centre and in Iraq, and asked for the consideration of appropriate measures.²³ These various reports appear to have caused Abdülhamid serious concern. His first practical step, in June 1891, was to order the dismissal of Sırrı Paşa, the Vali of Baghdad: 'the Sultan's favour towards Sırrı Paşa has disappeared because of the Iranians' penetration in Baghdad.'²⁴

At the same time, very much disturbed by the news of the Shiite presence in 6th Army, and after several consultations and considerations,²⁵ the Sultan issued instructions to the Grand Vizier and the *Serasker* to transfer some of the soldiers who belonged to the Shiite sect to other armies, and to maintain only Sunni soldiers in Baghdad *vilayet*.²⁶ Kamil Paşa objected that it was impossible to change people's beliefs by force, and that a coercive policy would simply drive local people to pretend to be Sunnis for a while. Under the circumstances, he argued, the aim could be achieved only by way of education and preaching. He proposed that a few students from each of the Shiite-inhabited towns and cities, such as Baghdad, Basra, Najaf and Karbala, should be sent to the madrasa of al-Azhar in Egypt, with stipends from the Ottoman government. In a period of 8–10 years, with the help of a good education, they would abandon their 'superstitious belief' and come back to their homeland as Sunnis. Then, they could be appointed to teach their fellow countrymen. Through this channel, Kamil Paşa added, as the number of this kind of ulama increased, they could overcome the Shiite mujtahids who were seducing the ignorant people with superstition. To support his point, Kamil Paşa gave the example of the American Missionaries who first brought up some young Armenians

in their schools according to the Protestant faith, and later sent them as teachers and preachers into the Armenian community in order to attract them to the Protestant faith. Kamil Paşa concluded therefore that it would be much more beneficial to employ this method, instead of using force (*tedabir-i zecriye*).²⁷

Abdülhamid approved Kamil Paşa's proposal except for one point, that of sending the students to Egypt – understandably, given his suspicion of the latter place as a potential opposition centre to the Ottoman Caliphate. Instead, the Sultan decided that a school for the students should be established in Istanbul: 'As there is no need to send Shiite youngsters to Egypt instead of Istanbul, a sufficient number of students should be brought to Istanbul in order to be educated in Arabic by the madrasa professors appointed by the *Şeyhülislam*, and sufficient salaries should be assigned to them when they return to their home districts after completing their education and becoming Sunnis.'²⁸

Accordingly, the Vali of Baghdad selected ten Shiite and two Sunni children from Baghdad and Karbala, and sent them to Istanbul.²⁹ Later, three more students joined them from Basra. But, contrary to expectations, nothing came of this project. In about one and a half years, six students left the school and went back to Iraq, and as late as 1907, only a few of those remaining had completed their studies. In March of that year, Mahmud, Şevket and Abdulhadi Efendis of this school were appointed as teachers and preachers in Baghdad by the order of the Sultan.³⁰

While these various reports, from officials who were familiar with Iraq, were being drafted and discussed, the Atabat began to emerge as an important opposition centre in Iranian politics, and the mujtahids of the Atabat began to get involved in Iranian internal affairs, for the first time. The trigger was the Tobacco Regie Crisis of 1891–2, provoked by the Shah's award of a monopoly concession for the purchase, sale and export of Iranian tobacco to a British subject. When the concession was first implemented in 1891, ulama-led protests developed in the major cities in Iran. One of the first protesters against the concession was Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, who had been living in Iran since December 1889. Afghani (1838/9–1897), who was a leading Muslim political activist and 'Pan-Islamic agitator' of the second half of the nineteenth century, had long been known to Abdülhamid.³¹

In early 1891, Afghani was expelled to Basra by the Shah. About June 1891, Afghani sent a letter from Basra to Mirza Hasan Shirazi, the chief mujtahid at Samarra, urging him to act. In late 1891, under pressure from the Shiite ulama of Iran and of the Atabat, Shirazi issued a decree saying that the use of tobacco was against the will of the Twelfth Imam, and there followed a universal boycott of tobacco throughout Iran. Nasir al-Din Shah was forced to cancel, first, the internal concession, and then after new disturbances, the export concession. The mujtahids of the Atabat had shown, and were shown, the extent of their political power within Iran.³²

This development did not escape the eyes of Sultan Abdülhamid, who appears to have seen the rift between the Iranian government and the Shiite mujtahids as an opportunity to promote a radical programme to secure a religious rapprochement between Shiite and Sunni Islam, and to extend his own political influence at the expense of the Shah. His chosen tool was Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, who had already written to the Sultan on several occasions in order to gain his support for 'Pan-Islamic' schemes for Muslim unity.³³ Afghani was invited to Istanbul by Abdülhamid

in the summer of 1892, though it is not clear, at this early stage, what Abdülhamid had in mind.³⁴ Although some have argued that Afghani was invited as a result of his earlier Pan-Islamic proposals to the Sultan, it is not clear whether Abdülhamid already had the intention of employing him for the Shiite problem and therefore against Iran, or whether he simply wanted to prevent Afghani from interfering in Caliphate discussions emanating from Egypt.

Afghani arrived in Istanbul towards the end of the summer of 1892. He was well received by the Sultan, and he was at first on good terms with Shaikh Abulhuda and the Sultan's other religious advisers and confidants.³⁵ By then, as noted, the Shiite problem in Iraq had already been given some thought by Abdülhamid; some measures had been taken; and a number of reports on the problem were reaching the Palace. It was also becoming clear that the measures thus far taken were likely to fail, in particular the education policy: as indicated above, after one and a half years, most of the students brought to Istanbul for training as Sunni preachers had gone back to Iraq. Since Abdülhamid mentioned this fact, in a letter to Afghani, as a reason for turning towards a new policy of Sunni–Shiite rapprochement, and given the fact that the school was opened at the end of 1891, it may safely be argued that not until the middle of 1893 did Abdülhamid ask for a proposal for a Pan-Islamic policy from Afghani. And, after a period of consideration and consultation by the Sultan, the activity for Sunni–Shiite unity seems to have begun only in early 1894. In the meantime, it becomes clear from the documents that Abdülhamid came to the conclusion, or rather was convinced by his advisers, that a policy of Sunni–Shiite unity would be the best long-term solution to the Shiite problem in Iraq.

It appears that Abdülhamid, probably in late 1893, wrote to Afghani on this issue and asked his opinion.³⁶ In the first part of his letter, the Sultan spoke of the activities of Christian missionaries within the Empire, accusing them of working against Muslim population. He then came to the point: 'There is no mistaking the necessity for Muslims to strengthen themselves and resist, through alliance and unity (*ittifak ve ittihadla*), the mischievous designs and initiatives of the Christians.' After mentioning Sultan Selim I's efforts to secure Muslim unity in the sixteenth century, Abdülhamid argued that:

The Iranians, constantly maintain their heretical beliefs in order to live separately from the Ottoman government, and have endeavoured to convert the Sunnis to their own sect by deceiving ignorant people in Iraq and Baghdad. In order to neutralize these efforts and deceptions, and to forestall [their] harm, some preachers, ulama and hodjas have been sent to these regions, and repeated orders have been communicated to the Valis and Mutasarrıfs; and, in this respect, great efforts have always been exerted, and though many children whose parents belong to the Shiite sect were asked to be brought to Istanbul and educated, later, some of them deserted due to their ill-health, and some others persisted in their false belief; and it is obvious that even though two or three of them were converted, no benefit will be gained from this. Up to now, no good result has been procured from the measures which have been taken.

The Sultan then complained of the protection of Armenian revolutionaries by the Iranian authorities:

Even though the Iranians are fundamentally Muslims, and pray, like us, towards the Kaaba at Mecca, [they] even support and protect, under the influence of this conflict of sect, the Armenian villains who work against the Muslims.

Abdülhamid concluded:

The necessity to adopt a serious remedy and measures against these regrettable conditions is obvious. And it is evident that this remedy and measures will be the ... creation of Islamic alliance and unity (*ittifak ve ittihad-ı İslam*) through the removal of conflicts and contradictions pertaining to sect.

Abdülhamid offered the following task to Sayyid Jamal al-Din:

As you have travelled in most of the lands of Islam, spent much time in Iran, and thoroughly studied the difference between the four [Sunni] sects and the Shiite sect, and as, through time spent in Europe, you have knowledge of general affairs, and as [I] am certain that you desire to achieve the unity of Islam (*ittihad-ı İslam*), it is my command as Caliph that you recommence the initiatives which previously proved fruitless, due to the lack of ulama who understood politics, and that you consider at length and in detail whether or not a general Islamic union (*ittihad-ı İslam*) may be achieved, in accordance with the verse 'Indeed Muslims are brothers,' by abolishing the sectarian differences between Muslims in some parts of the Ottoman Empire, and also in some other places: by, for instance, forming a committee of two or three persons each from our ulama and the Shiite ulama, eliminating the dissension of sect, so overcoming, and perhaps entirely removing, the influence of the Iranian mujtahids, so that finally, as in Germany, a union may be connected, in which the rulers of Iran continue to govern within Iran, but military command is [the property] of the office of Caliph.

The Sultan requested a detailed report, and warned Afghani to maintain the project in the strictest secrecy.³⁷ Abdülhamid also stated in his *Pensees et souvenirs de l'ex-Sultan Abdul Hamid II* that there was advantage for the Iranians to come to an understanding with the Ottomans, in order not to be the toy of Russia and England, and that 'Seyyid Cemaleddin,' 'a famous scholar in Yıldız Palace,' encouraged him for the unity of Sunnis and Shiites, as did Hacı Mirza Khan, the Iranian Consul in Istanbul. The Sultan added that 'Cemaleddin' won over some ulama in Iran, in addition to several Iranian high officials, and that it would be a great step even if there was not be a full agreement in that respect, and a rapprochement would be achieved between two countries.³⁸

Afghani's reply has not been traced, but it appears that Abdülhamid postponed any further action for some time.³⁹ It appears from the available accounts that implementation of the project began in early 1894, probably just before a serious outbreak of disturbances between Sunnis and Shiites in Samarra. This Samarra incident acted as a further stimulus to the Sultan's efforts to procure a Sunni-Shiite rapprochement, and is therefore worth examining.⁴⁰ The incident occurred without

warning in April 1894. It began as a petty quarrel about some money transaction between a Sunni and a Shiite resident of the town, but rapidly developed into something like a religious war between Sunnis and Shiites, in which several people were killed.⁴¹

After the incident, Mockler, the British Consul-General at Baghdad, sought to visit Samarra in order to assure the safety of British Indian students residing there.⁴² Interestingly enough, it appears that the Ottoman authorities were much more disturbed by the visit of the British Consul-General than by the Samarra incident itself, and attempted in vain to stop Mockler.⁴³ Meanwhile, the Dragoman of the Russian Embassy called on the Ottoman Foreign Minister, and alleged that the main reason for Mockler's journey to Samarra was to enable the chief mujtahid to escape to India. This inevitably reinforced the Porte's suspicions.⁴⁴

Furthermore, the Samarra incident caused much trouble among the Shiite population both in the Atabat and in Iran. Some of the Shiite ulama of Samarra forbade their followers to open their shops, and stopped leading prayers as a protest, but eventually, Mirza Hasan Shirazi made a declaration calling for calm.⁴⁵ In his instructions to the Grand Vizier, Cevad Paşa, Abdülhamid blamed the local authorities for being incautious, and emphasized that due to the fact that there were foreign citizens among the people involved in the incident, foreign consuls, and especially the British Consul-General, had got involved. The Sultan expressed particular concern lest the British attempt to take the chief mujtahid under their protection. Abdülhamid ordered that a commission, composed of officials who were familiar with the region, be formed to investigate the situation, in consultation with the Vali of Baghdad.⁴⁶

At the same time, Abdülhamid also consulted Ali Galib Bey, the Ottoman Ambassador at Tehran, seeking his opinion on the Samarra incident, the mujtahids and Shiites in Iraq. The Ambassador replied as follows:⁴⁷

It is my humble opinion that the objective can be obtained, by, for example, inculcating in the minds of the [local] and Iranian population the idea that the survival of the Shiite sect in Baghdad is not [the result], as is believed, of the influence of the Iranian state, but of the protection of His Imperial Majesty the Caliph; by, as far as possible, rendering ineffective the Iranian consuls' initiatives in matters pertaining to sect, and so strengthening the material and moral bonds of the Shiite ulama to the sacred office of the Great Caliphate; and in sum, by materially demonstrating to the subjects and ulama of Iran that they can derive no benefit from the Iranian state and its officials, and that on the contrary, it is adherence to the Ottoman Sultanate which is the cause of prosperity and salvation. . .

The Ambassador's report reveals that Abdülhamid had already decided to win over some Iranian mujtahids to his side. A decoration was given to 'Aqa Sayyid Abdullah,' a Tehran mujtahid, for unspecified services rendered, and a Tehran Embassy employee, Mirza Hasan Khan, was instructed to involve himself in Iranian affairs.⁴⁸

Sultan Abdülhamid seems to have thought that the Iranians were behind the Samarra incident. Faced already with the problem of Armenian revolutionaries

crossing the Iranian border into eastern Anatolia, the Sultan appears to have felt that the Shah of Iran was also putting pressure on him in Iraq. In response, Abdülhamid decided to implement the earlier proposals for a Sunni–Shiite rapprochement: this offered the prospect of a final solution to the Shiite problem in Iraq, and also a means of counter-attack against the Shah of Iran.⁴⁹

It appears that as a result, a working-group was set up under Afghani, and sent hundreds of letters to prominent Shiite ulama all over the Islamic world. According to the account given by Afzal al-Mulk, who was himself part of Afghani's Iranian circle in Istanbul:⁵⁰

...The Ottoman Sultan came to believe in the unity of the different Islamic groups and asked Sayyed Jamal ed din to write to the Shiitete ulama in Iran and Iraq and call them to unity. The late Sayyed Jamal ed din answered that this problem had great importance for Islamic states. Today the Moslems of the world were more than three hundred million, and if they believed in unity and brotherhood among themselves no government or people could prevail over or excel them. He said if he had the power of the sultanate and the necessary money ... he could accomplish this great work with the help of a circle of patriotic intellectuals. The Ottoman Sultan gave guarantees and obligations for this. The Sayyed formed a society of Iranian and other Shiitete men of letters who were in Istanbul.

According to Afzal al-Mulk, this group was made up of 12 men: 'Novvab Vala Hajj Sheikh ol Ra'is [Mirza Hasan Shaikh al-Rais], Feizi Efendi Moallem Irani [Muallim Feyzi Efendi],⁵¹ Reza Paşa Shiite [Yusuf Rıza Paşa], Sayyed Borhan ed din Balkhi [Sayyid Burhaneddin Belhi],⁵² Novvab Hossein Hindi, Ahmad Mirza (who had just come from Iran to Istanbul), Hajj Mirza Hasan Khan (the Iranian Consul-General),⁵³ Mirza Aqa Khan Kermani,⁵⁴ Shaikh Ahmad Ruhi (brother of the writer),⁵⁵ Afzal al-Mulk Kermani (the writer), Abdol Karim Bey and Hamid Bey Javaherizadeh Esfahani.' According to the account:⁵⁶

When the Sayyed's group was formed, he spoke to it as follows: Today the religion of Islam is like a ship whose captain is Mohammad, peace be with him, and all Moslems are passengers of this holy ship, and this unhappy ship is caught in a storm and threatened with sinking, and unbelievers and freethinkers from every side have pierced this ship. What is the duty of the passengers of such a ship, threatened with sinking, and its inhabitants close to perdition? Should they first try to preserve and save this ship from the storm and from sinking, or instead bring the ship and each other to the verge of ruin through discord, personal motives, and petty disagreements? All with one voice answered that preserving the territory of Islam and this holy ship was the religious duty of every Muslim (...). Then the Sayyed asked all to write to every acquaintance and friend in Iran and the shrines of Iraq, in general, and in particular to the Shiitete ulama in India, Iran and Arab lands, Balkh, and Turkestan, about the kindness and benevolence of the great Islamic Sultan toward all Moslems of whatever opinion and group they might be. If the Shiitete ulama united in this Islamic unity the Sultan would give every one of

them, according to his rank, special favor and a monthly salary, and would order Ottoman officials to observe the same good conduct toward Iranians in Mecca and Medina as toward their own people, and in recognition of this great action of the Shiitete ulama and the state of Iran he would bestow on them the holy cities of Iraq.. (the society agreed) and about 400 letters were written in all directions, and a report of this society was given to the Ottoman Sultan. . . . After six months about 200 petitions from the Arab and Iranian Shiitete ulama with some gifts and antiques were sent the Sultan through Sayyed Jamal ed Din. (He translated the petitions into Turkish and took them to the Sultan.) . . . The Ottoman Caliph was so happy to see these letters that he embraced the late Sayyed and kissed his face and said to him: since some are such fanatical Sunnites and will find a pretext to accuse me of Shiitesm, it is better that we turn over the accomplishment of this holy goal to the Prime Minister and the High Gate. We will have the Sheikh of Islam collaborate with us confidentially. He accepted the royal will in this matter and an imperial command went to the High Gate. I was delegated to go to the holy cities of Iraq to investigate the mentality and affairs of the ulama and give a report to the High Gate.

However, the correspondence between Afghani's Istanbul circle and the Shiite ulama was learned of by the Iranian Consul at Baghdad, and by the Iranian Ambassador at Istanbul, and reported to the Shah. While, on the one hand, the Iranian Ambassador demanded the deportation of Afghani, Ruhi, Kermani, and Mirza Hasan Khan;⁵⁷ on the other, the Iranian authorities began to use the 'Armenian question,' as a means of pressure, giving a free hand to the Armenian revolutionaries, inside Iran and on the border. The pressure appears to have been effective. It should be remembered that the period between August 1894 and the summer of 1896 saw the Armenian issue reach a crisis, both in Anatolia and in Istanbul.⁵⁸ At this stage, Abdülhamid appears to have been forced to give up his support for the task, mainly because of this Iranian support or tolerance for Armenian revolutionaries in eastern Anatolia.

By the end of 1895, furthermore, Afghani's relations with Abdülhamid were deteriorating, thanks to a number of incidents which undermined Abdülhamid's trust: Afghani's secret meeting with the Khedive of Egypt in the summer of 1895, his protection of an Arab dissident, Sayyid Abdullah of the Hijaz, and quarrels with the Sultan's confidants, paved the way for his fall from favour.⁵⁹ Afghani tried to leave Istanbul, but failed to obtain the Sultan's permission, while his attempt to gain a British passport from the British Embassy met with no success.⁶⁰

In the meantime, Abdülhamid strongly resisted Iranian demands for Afghani's deportation. But for some of the latter's companions, the situation was not that easy. As a result of constant Iranian pressure, Mirza Aqa Khan Kermani, Shaikh Ahmad Ruhi, and Mirza Hasan Khan were arrested and banished to Trabzon, probably in January 1896.⁶¹ At about the same time, *Akhtar*, a Persian opposition newspaper, published in Istanbul since 1876, was closed by the Porte.⁶²

After the assassination of Nasir al-Din Shah, on 1 May 1896, by Mirza Riza Kermani, an ex-servant and disciple of Afghani, who had visited the latter in Istanbul, Iranian pressure increased. The Iranian government demanded Afghani and the three men be detained at Trabzon, as collaborators in the assassination of Nasir al-Din Shah. The Armenians, on the other hand, were still causing problems

on the border. The Grand Vizier, Rifat Paşa, advised the Sultan to extradite Afghani and the three men, accusing the former of being a Babi heretic and of maintaining contacts with Freemasons, Armenians and Young Turks.⁶³ Though Abdülhamid never gave away Afghani,⁶⁴ the three men detained at Trabzon were extradited to Iran in May 1896, and executed in Tabriz in July 1896.⁶⁵ Afghani remained in Istanbul as a virtual prisoner until his death in March 1897.⁶⁶ However, in the early 1900s, Sultan Abdülhamid continued his efforts to solve the Shiite problem in Iraq, as well as to gain support among the Shiite ulama in the Atabat.⁶⁷

Notes

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- 1 For different estimates, see Vital Cuinet, *La Turquie D'Asie*, III (Paris, 1894), pp.17, 220–1; Şemseddin Sami, *Kamusu'l-Alam*, 6 Vols. (Istanbul, 1306–16); Admiralty, *A Handbook of Mesopotamia*, Vol.1 (London, 1916), p.66; Foreign Office, *Mesopotamia* (London, 1920), p.36; Joyce N. Wiley, *The Islamic Movement of Shi'as* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1992), p.9.
- 2 See Yitzhak Nakash, *The Shiites of Iraq* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), pp.25–48; idem., 'The Conversion of Iraq's Tribes to Shiism,' *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol. 26 (1994), pp.443–63.
- 3 For Ottoman–Iranian relations in the nineteenth century, see Mohammed Reza Nasiri, *Nasireddin Şah Zamanında Osmanlı–İran Münasebetleri, 1848–1896* (Tokyo, 1991); Richard Schofield (ed.) *The Iran–Iraq Border 1840–1958*, 9 Vols (Archive Editions, 1989), Vols.1–4.
- 4 See Hamid Algar, 'Atabat,' *EIr*, II, pp.902–3; Moojan Momen, *An Introduction to Shiite Islam: The History and Doctrines of Twelver Shiism* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985), pp.143–4.
- 5 See Meir Litvak, *Shiite Scholars of nineteenth-century Iraq: The ulama of Najaf and Karbala* (Cambridge: CUP, 1998); idem., 'Continuity and Change in the Ulama Population of Najaf and Karbala, 1791–1904: A Socio-Demographic Study,' *Iranian Studies*, Vol.23 (1990), pp.31–60.
- 6 See Nakash, *The Shiites of Iraq*, pp.163–201, 238ff; J.G. Lorimer, *Gazetteer of the Persian Gulf, Oman and Central Arabia* (Calcutta, 1908–15), I/2, pp.2358–63.
- 7 See Juan R.I. Cole, 'Indian Money' and the Shiite Shrine Cities of Iraq, 1786–1850,' *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol.22 (1986), pp.461–80; Meir Litvak, 'Money, Religion, and Politics: The Oudh Bequest in Najaf and Karbala, 1850–1903,' *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol.33 (2001), pp.1–21; Nakash, *The Shiites of Iraq*, pp.205ff; Lorimer, *Gazetteer*, I/1B, pp.1409–15, 1477–84, 1598–1616.
- 8 See Lorimer, *Gazetteer*, I/2, p.2357.
- 9 See Nakash, 'The Conversion of Iraq's Tribes to Shiism'; cf. Gertrude L. Bell, *Review of the Civil Administration of Iraq* (London: HMSO, 1920), p.27.
- 10 See J.R. Barnes, *An Introduction to Religious Foundations in the Ottoman Empire* (Leiden: Brill, 1987), pp.67–153.
- 11 See Nasiri, *Nasireddin Şah*, passim.
- 12 For interesting details, see the letter from Âli Paşa to Midhat Paşa in Ali Haydar Midhat, *The Life of Midhat Pasha* (London: Murray, 1903), pp.61–2; and the letters of Osman Hamdi Bey, who worked under Midhat Paşa at Baghdad, to his father, Edhem Paşa, in Edhem Eldem, 'Quelques lettres D'Osman Hamdi Bey à son père lors de son séjour en Irak (1869–70),' *Anatolia Moderna*, Vol.1 (1990), pp.126–7.
- 13 The exceptions were Mehmed Namık Paşa's two reports: Ahmet Nuri Sinaplı, *Şeyhül Vüzera, Serasker Mehmet Namık Paşa* (Istanbul, 1987), pp.259–60, dated 25 Receb 1296–15 July 1879, and BOA, Y.PRK.KOM. 4/33, 11 Safer 1301–12 Dec. 1883.
- 14 For these reports, see Gökhan Çetinsaya, 'The Ottoman View of the Shiite Community of Iraq in the Late Nineteenth Century' in A. Monsutti, S. Naef, and F. Sabahi (eds.), *The Other Shiites: from Mediterranean to Central Asia* (London: RoutledgeCurzon, forthcoming); this is relatively a new subject in the literature. For different treatments of the subject, see Selim Deringil, 'The Struggle against Shiism in Hamidian Iraq: A Study in Ottoman Counter-Propaganda', *Die Welt des Islams*, (2)

- Vol.30 (1990), pp.45–62, and Cezmi Eraslan, *II. Abdülhamid ve İslam Birliği* (Istanbul: Ötüken, 1992), pp.307ff.
- 15 For details, see Gökhan Çetinsaya, *Ottoman Administration of Iraq, 1890–1908* (London: RoutledgeCurzon, forthcoming), ch.5.
- 16 BOA, YEE 18/553/610/93/38, (n.d.), and YEE 14/88/11-b/88/12, (n.d.); cf. Juan R.I. Cole, ‘Shaikh al-Ra’is and Sultan Abdülhamid II: The Iranian Dimension of Pan-Islam’, in I. Gershoni et al. (eds.) *Histories of the Modern Middle East: new directions*, (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2002), pp.167–85, and Mehrdad Kia, ‘Pan-Islamism in Late Nineteenth-Century Iran,’ *Middle Eastern Studies*, 32/1 (1996), pp.30–52.
- 17 Shaikh al-Rais later published a treatise called *İttihad-ı İslam* (Bombay, 1312/1894–5).
- 18 BOA, YEE 18/553/610/93/38, (n.d.). For Cevdet Paşa (1823–95), see *EI*(2), I, p.284.
- 19 BOA, YEE 14/88/11-b/88/12, (n.d.) [c. Sept. 1888]. Cf. Y.PRK.BŞK. 14/4, 28 Ağustos 1304–9 Sep. 1888. It should be noted that some parts of Yusuf Rıza Paşa’s report contain very similar, sometimes same, remarks as that of Cevdet Paşa; Yusuf Rıza Paşa (1826–94) was a former Minister to Tehran and a Shiite convert. See Osman Nuri Ergin, *İstanbul Şehreminleri*, A.N. Galitekin (ed.) (Istanbul: İstanbul Büyükşehir Belediyesi, 1996), pp.153–7; İ.A. Gövsa, *Türk Meşhurları Ansiklopedisi* (Istanbul: Yedigün, 1946), p.329.
- 20 Ibid.
- 21 See, for example, BOA, Y.PRK.MK. 4/80, 27 Şevval 1306–26 June 1889, and A.MKT.MHM. 500/33, 5 Şubat 1305–17 Feb. 1890.
- 22 Cf. BOA, Y.MTV. 43/14, 25 Mayıs 1306–6 June 1890; the committee devoted a full chapter of its report to the Shiite problem. Y.A.Res. 55/9, 28 Ramazan 1308–7 May 1891.
- 23 BOA, Y.MTV. 43/14, 23 Şevval 1307–12 June 1890; YEE 45/24, 10 Muharrem 1308–26 Aug. 1890; Y.PRK.BŞK. 19/6, 10 Muharrem 1308–26 Aug. 1890.
- 24 BOA, Y.A.Hus. 248/74, and 248/44, 16 Zilkade 1308–23 June 1891.
- 25 See, for example, Y.MTV. 51/24, 9 Zilkade 1308–16 June 1891, and Y.PRK.BŞK. 22/51, 7 Zilhicce 1308–14 July 1891.
- 26 BOA, Irade-Dahiliye, no. 96880, the *tezkere* of Kamil Paşa, dated 14 Zilhicce 1308–21 July 1891.
- 27 Ibid.
- 28 Ibid. Irade dated 16 Zilhicce 1308–23 July 1891. For further details, Y.PRK.BŞK. 22/62, 15 Zilhicce 1308–22 July 1891; Y.MTV. 54/82, 22 Safer 1309–27 Sep. 1891.
- 29 BOA, Irade-Dahiliye, no. 98525, 29 Cemaziyelevvel 1309–31 Dec. 1891. Their expenses cost 11,351,50 *kuruş*. In his minute, the Sultan approved the action of the Vali, but at the same time noted that since a lot of money was spent on these children, the best result must be obtained from their education; in a later decree, the Sultan instructed Cevad Paşa, the Grand Vizier, to spend 5,000 *kurush* from the Privy Purse for the expenses of these children. BOA, Irade-Dahiliye, no. 98993, 19 Cemaziyelâhir 1309–20 Jan. 1892. Also, Y.PRK.BŞK. 24/66, 21. Cemaziyelevvel 1309–23 Dec. 1891.
- 30 Cezmi Eraslan, ‘İkinci Abdülhamid Devrinde Osmanlı Devleti Dahilinde ve Afrika Kıtasında İslam Birliği Faaliyetleri’ (Unpublished M.A. Thesis, University of Istanbul, 1985), pp.64–5.
- 31 For Afghani, see Nikki R. Keddie, ‘Afgani, Jamal-al-Din,’ in *EIr*, I, pp.481–6; idem., *Sayyid Jamal ad-Din ‘al-Afghani’: A Political Biography* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972).
- 32 For full details of the subject, see Nikki R. Keddie, *Religion and Rebellion in Iran: The Tobacco Protest of 1891–1892* (London: Frank Cass, 1966); and idem., *Political Biography*, pp.330ff; A.K.S. Lambton, ‘The Tobacco Regie: a prelude to revolution,’ in idem., *Qajar Persia* (London: I.B. Tauris, 1987), pp.223–76; Edward G. Browne, *The Persian Revolution of 1905–1909* (Cambridge: CUP, 1910), pp.15ff, 31–58; Firuz Kazemzadeh, *Russia and Britain in Persia, 1864–1914: A Study in Imperialism* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), pp.241ff.
- 33 See Keddie, *Political Biography*, pp.129ff, 246ff; idem., ‘The Pan-Islamic Appeal: Afghani and Abdulhamid II,’ *Middle Eastern Studies*, 3 (1966), pp.46–67; Jacob M. Landau, ‘Al-Afghani’s Panislamic Project,’ *Islamic Culture*, 26 (July 1952), pp.50–4; idem., ‘An Egyptian Petition to Abdul Hamid II on behalf of al-Afghani,’ in *Studies in Islamic History and Civilization: in Honour of Professor David Ayalon*, ed. M. Sharon (Jerusalem: Cana, 1986), pp.209–19.
- 34 Afghani had left Basra for London in the autumn of 1891. For details afterwards, Keddie, *Political Biography*, pp.370ff; idem., *Religion and Rebellion*, p.126–7; Browne, *Persian Revolution*, pp.24–7, 82; FO 60/594, Sir Lascelles to Foreign Office, Tehran, 7 Aug. 1892, tel no. 114; A. Albert Kudsi-Zadeh, ‘Iranian Politics in the late Qajar Period: A Review,’ *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol.5 (1969), pp.251–7.

- 35 Keddie, *Political Biography*, pp.373ff. Cf. Browne, *Persian Revolution*, pp.82–3, 403–4; see also Fahir Iz, ‘Mehmed Emin,’ *EI*(2), VI, p.988; [Mirza Aqa Khan Kermani], ‘Controverses Persanes,’ *Revue du Monde Musulman*, Vol.21 (Dec. 1912), pp.238–60.
- 36 BOA, YEE I/156/XXV/156/3, (n.d.), transliterated in *Sultan II. Abdülhamid Han: Devlet ve Memleket Görüşlerim*, pp.305–11.
- 37 Ibid.
- 38 Sultan Abdülhamit, *Siyasî Hatıratım* (Istanbul: Dergah, 1974), p.179.
- 39 See Afghani’s undated letter to the Sultan, which appears to have been written in this period, in Martin Kramer, *Islam Assembled: The Advent of Muslim Congresses* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), pp.21–2. Cf. Keddie, *Political Biography*, pp.444–7.
- 40 According to the account given by Mirza Muhammad Riza, who assassinated Nasir al-Din Shah: ‘Thus it came about that he entered into correspondence with all the Shiite divines of Karbala, Najaf and all parts of Persia, and convinced them by promises, hopes and logical demonstrations that if the Muhammadan nations would only unite, all the nations on earth could not prevail against them. They must put aside their verbal differences concerning Ali and Umar, and look at the question of Caliphate, ... and do this and that ... just at this juncture the trouble at Samarra, and the dispute as to the relations of the late *Hujjatu’l-Islam* Mirza-yi Shirazi with inhabitants of Samarra and the Sunnis, broke out. The Sultan of Turkey, imagining that the Shah of Persia had specially fomented this trouble so as to disturb the Ottoman dominions, held consultations and discussions on this subject with the Sayyid. He said, ‘By reason of the long duration of his reign and his venerable age, Nasirud-Din Shah has acquired a power and prestige such that, if he is firm, the Shiite divines and the people of Persia will not move to support our ideas or accomplish our aims. We must therefore think of some plan for dealing with him personally.’ Then he said to the Sayyid, ‘Do whatever you can in regard to him, and be not anxious about anything.’ In Browne, *Persian Revolution*, p.83 (from the interrogation of Mirza Riza).
- 41 For full details, see the three lengthy documents: FO 195/1841, Mockler to Currie, no. 210/23, Baghdad, 21 April 1894; FO 195/1841, no. 237/24, Mockler to Currie, Baghdad, 5 May 1894; BOA, Y.A.Hus. 296/39, 4 Zilkade 1311–9 May 1894.
- 42 See, especially, FO 195/1841, Mockler to Currie, no. 210/23, Baghdad, 21 April 1894.
- 43 FO 195/1841, no. 237/24, Mockler to Currie, Baghdad, 5 May 1894; BOA, Y.A.Hus. 295/40, 22 Şevval 1311–28 April 1894; Y.A.Hus. 295/77, 26 Şevval 1311–2 May 1894; Y.A.Hus. 295/89, 27 Şevval 1311–3 May 1894; Y.A.Hus. 296/9, Gurre-i Zilkade 1311–6 May 1894; Y.A.Hus. 301/27, 22 Zilhicce 1311–26 June 1894.
- 44 BOA, Y.A.Hus. 296/39, 4 Zilkade 1311–9 May 1894; Y.A.Hus. 296/9, 24 Nisan 1310–6 May 1894; FO 195/1841, no. 242/25, Mockler to Currie, Baghdad, 9 May 1894.
- 45 Ibid., and FO 195/1841, no.281/33, Mockler to Currie, Baghdad, 23 May 1894. Cf. FO 424/183, Currie to Salisbury, no. 472 confidential, 16 July 1895; BOA, Y.A.Hus. 299/76, 7 Zilhicce 1311–11 June 1894; Y.A. Hus. 299/77, 2 Zilhicce 1311–6 June 1894; Y.A.Hus. 301/7, 21 Zilhicce 1311–25 June 1894; Mirza Hasan Shirazi issued a ‘ukase’ to the inhabitants of the Shiite towns in Iraq, probably in May 1894, with reference to the recent disturbance at Samarra and excitement caused thereby in various places. Meanwhile, the Shah of Iran asked for the punishment of those involved in the incident. In turn, the Ottomans demanded the deportation of the Iranian Deputy-Consul of Samarra, who caused so much trouble during the incident. FO 195/1841, no. 281/33, Mockler to Currie, 23 May 1894. For the text of the ‘ukase’, see *ibid.*, and Y.A. Hus. 301/27, 22 Zilhicce 1311–26 June 1894.
- 46 BOA, Irade-Hususi, no.120, 1 Zilkade 1311–6 May 1894; Y.A. Hus. 296/39, 4 Zilkade 1311–9 May 1894.
- 47 BOA, YEE 14/1623/126/10, 11 Safer 1312–14 Aug. 1894; Ali Galib Bey held the post in Tehran between December 1892 and late 1894. See Nejat Göyünç, ‘XIX. Yüzyılda Tahrân’daki Temsilcilerimiz ve Türk–İran Münasebetlerine Etkileri,’ in *Atatürk Konferansları, V: 1971–1972* (Ankara: TTK, 1975), p.277.
- 48 Ibid. ‘Aqa Sayyid Abdullah’ was most probably Sayyid Abdallah Behbahani (1840–1910), one of the influential Tehrani ulama. For him, see *EIr*, I, pp.190–3.
- 49 Cf. Browne, *Persian Revolution*, p.83.
- 50 See ‘Biography of Mirza Aqa Khan Kirmani by Afzal al Mulk Kirmani, prefaced to the anonymous Azali Babi text *Hasht Bihist* (n.p., n.d.),’ translated in Keddie, ‘Religion and Irreligion in Early Iranian

- Nationalism,' *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, Vol.4 (1962), appendix; cf. Mirza Muhammad Riza's account in Browne, *Persian Revolution*, pp.63–92.
- 51 For Muallim Feyzi Efendi (1842–1910), known as 'Acem Feyzi,' see Gövsa, *Türk Meşhurları*, pp.139–40, and *Türk Dili ve Edebiyatı Ansiklopedisi* (Istanbul: Dergah, 1979), III, p.215. Muallim Feyzi was a Persian teacher in the prestigious Galatasaray Lycée, and an author of Persian–Turkish dictionaries.
- 52 See İsmail Kara, 'Cemaleddin Efgani Biyografisine iki önemli katkı,' *Amel Defteri* (Istanbul: Kitabevi, 1998), pp.195–9.
- 53 Also known as 'Khabir al-Mulk.' See H. Farmayan and E. L. Daniel (eds.) *A Skiitete Pilgrimage to Mecca, 1885–1886: The Safarnameh of Mirza Mohammad Hosayn Farahani* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1990), p.142; Keddie, *Political Biography*, p.382; for Abdülhamid's remark on him, see Sultan Abdülhamit, *Siyasî Hatıratım*, p.179.
- 54 For Kermani (1854/55–1896) and his activities in Istanbul, see Mangol Bayat, 'Aqa Khan Kermani,' *EIr*, II, pp.175–7; idem., 'Mirza Aqa Khan Kermani: A 19th Century Persian Nationalist,' *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol.10 (1974), pp.36–59; Keddie, *Political Biography*, pp.377–8, 417–8; Shaul Bakhash, *Iran: Monarchy, Bureaucracy and Reform under the Qajars, 1858–1896* (London: Ithaca, 1978), pp.312ff; in part of one of his poems, Kermani wrote (translated in Browne, *Persian Revolution*, p.412): 'And that, under the auspices of [Sultan Abdu'l] Hamid, a political union might be effected in Islam; so that Turk should be Persian, and Persian like Turk, and that duality might no longer remain in these great rulers; and that in like manner the learned doctors of Iraq should agree in [recognizing] the [Sultan as] sovereign supreme; and should swiftly cleanse their hearts of this animosity, and should no longer talk of who was Sunni and who Shiite.'
- 55 For Shaikh Ahmad Ruhi (c.1855/6–1896), see Kramer, *Islam Assembled*, p.21; Browne, *Persian Revolution*, pp.414–5. According to Browne, he 'even caused a seal to be made for himself bearing the following inscription: 'I am the Propagandist of Pan-Islamism: Ahmad-i-Ruhi is my name.'
- 56 Keddie, 'Religion and Irreligion in Early Iranian Nationalism,' appendix.
- 57 Keddie, *Political Biography*, p.382; cf. Browne, *Persian Revolution*, pp.63–4, 415.
- 58 See, for details, Salahi R. Sonyel, *The Ottoman Armenians* (London: K.Rustem & Brother, 1987), pp.155ff; Stanford J. and Ezel K. Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey* (Cambridge: CUP, 1977), II, pp.200–5.
- 59 See Keddie, *Political Biography*, pp.383–4. The Khedive was also on bad terms with the Sultan at that time. A Meccan Shaikh who had called on the Khedive during this visit was arrested. See L. Hirszowicz, 'The Sultan and the Khedive, 1892–1908,' *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol.8 (1972), p.303.
- 60 FO 60/594, Currie to Salisbury, no.923, Constantinople, 12 Dec. 1895; Keddie, *Political Biography*, pp.384ff, for his other attempts and his letter to the Sultan.
- 61 See Bayat, *EIr*, II, p.176; cf. Keddie, *Political Biography*, p.382. Bayat gives the date of their banishment to Trabzon as January 1895, which seems confusing. Keddie, on the other hand, gives the date as the end of 1895.
- 62 For the importance and influence of the paper, see *EIr*, I, p.730; Edward G. Browne, *The Press and Poetry of Modern Persia* (Cambridge: CUP, 1914), pp.17–18, 36–7; Orhan Koloğlu, 'Un Journal Persan D'Istanbul: Akhtar,' in T. Zarcone and F. Zarinebaf-Shahr, eds, *Les Iraniens d'Istanbul* (Istanbul–Tehran: IFEA-IFRI, 1993), pp.133–40; Anja Pistor-Hatam, 'The Persian Newspaper *Akhtar* as a Transmitter of Ottoman Political Ideas,' in *ibid.*, pp.141–7; Kermani and Ruhi were among the writers of the paper. *Akhtar* was also known for its Pan-Islamic stand from the very beginning.
- 63 BOA, YEE 3/110/31/1709, dated 22 Nisan 1312–4 May 1896, transliterated in Fahri Ç. Derin, 'Cemâleddin Efgânî Hakkında İki Vesika,' *Tarih ve Toplum*, 84 (Aralık 1990), pp.53–6.
- 64 See Azmi Özcan, 'Jamaladdin Afghani's Honorable Confinement in Istanbul and Iran's Demands for His Extradition,' *Osmanlı Araştırmaları*, 15 (1995), pp.285–91.
- 65 See Bayat, *EIr*, II, p.176; Browne, *Persian Revolution*, p.415; Keddie, *Political Biography*, pp.417–18.
- 66 For details of this period of Afghani, see Keddie, *Political Biography*, pp.404ff.
- 67 For details, see Çetinsaya, *Ottoman Administration of Iraq*, ch. 5.